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'Why are they doing this, do you think?' Coleridge asked. 
'Why do you think? To get famous'. 
'Ah, yes, of course,' said Coleridge. 'Fame'. 
'Fame', he thought, ' the holy grail of a secular age'. The cruel and demanding 
deity that had replaced God. The one thing. The only thing, it seemed to 
Coleridge, that mattered any more. The great obsession, the all-encompassing 
national focus, which occupied 90 per cent of every newspaper and 100 per cent 
of every magazine. Not faith, but fame. 
'Fame', he murmured once more. 'I hope they enjoy it'. 
'They won ' t', Geraldine replied. 
1 Ben Elton Dead Famous (Bantam, London, 200 I) 242-243. 
Ben Elton ' 
3 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
Abstract .............................................................................................................. 6 
I INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 7 
II CELEBRITY ..................................................................... 8 
A The Emergence of Celebrity ................................................... 8 
B An Attempt to Define Celebrity ................................................ 8 
C Conflict of Need for Public Attention and Respect for Privacy .......... 11 
III PRIVACY ......................................................................... 12 
A Definition of Privacy ................................... .. ....................... 12 
B Impact Privacy Has on the Individual .................................... ... 13 
C Impact Privacy Has on a Democratic Society ............................... 15 
IV LAW OF PRIVACY IN NEW ZEALAND .•................................ 17 
A Provisions Concerning Photographs ......................................... 11 
B The Tort of Invasion of Privacy ............................................. .. 18 
1 The several elements of the tort of privacy .... .......... .. ..... ....... .... .... ... . 19 
(a) A reasonable expectation of privacy .................................. 19 
(b) Public disclosure................................................. . .... 20 
(c) Offensive and objectionable nature of the publicity ........... .... 20 
(d) Private facts .............................................................. 21 
(e) Public interest. .......... .. . .. ................................... .... .. ... 22 
(f) Privacy rights of celebrities' children ............................... 23 
(g) Summary: Outcome of the Hosking decision for celebrities ...... 24 
C Important Australian and English Cases as Possible Guidelines ....... 25 
D Privacy Decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority ............. 21 
E Privacy Principles of the Press Council ..... ................................ 29 
F General Outcome for Celebrities: Summary ................................ 30 
G Remedies Provided for an Invasion of Privacy ............................. 32 
H Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the Tort of 
Privacy ............................................................................ 32 
V LAW OF PRIVACY IN GERMANY ......................................... 35 
A The Recognition of the Right to Privacy ..................................... 36 
B The Horizontal Effect of the Basic Law ..................................... 37 
C Private Statutory Protection of Privacy and the Provided 
Remedies . ......................................................................... 38 
4 
D Protection of the Right to Control One's Own Image ................... ... 39 
1 Exemptions to section 22 Copyright (Art Domain) Act ....... . ............... . .40 
E Interpretation of Sections 22 and 23 Copyright 
(Art Domain) Act ............................................................. .. . 41 
1 Judgment of the Hamburg Regional Court and Court of Appeal .... ....... .43 
2 Judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of 19 December 1995 ......... ... 42 
3 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of 15 December 1999 .................................................................. .. .43 
(a) Privacy rights of celebrity children ........................... .44 
4 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights ........................... ... 44 
F Enforcement of the European Court Judgement in Germany ......... .... 46 
1 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court concerning 
the binding effect of ECHR decisions.......................................... . ... 46 
2 German jurisprudence in the aftermath of the "Caroline rulings"... . . .48 
G Outcome of the Caroline Rulings for Celebrities in Germany ......... ... 49 
VI LAW OF PRIVACY IN CANADA .......................................... ... 50 
A Privacy Protection for Intrusions by the Media in Quebec ............... . 50 
B Privacy Protection for Intrusions by the Media in the 
Common Law Provinces ...................................................... .. 52 
1 Provinces with a statutory tort of privacy....................................... .. 52 
2 Provinces without a statutory tort of privacy ................................ . 53 
C Outcome for Celebrities in Canada ............................................ 56 
VII PRIVACY RIGHTS IN COMPARISON ....................................... 57 
A Protection of Facts and Images ................................................. 57 
B Rights of Celebrities' Children ............................................... ... 59 
C Impact of Constitutional Documents ........................................... 59 
D Provided Remedies......................................................... . .... 61 
E Canada ..................................................................... ... ... 62 
VIII WHY AND HOW CANADA'S COMMON LAW 
PROVINCES SHOULD RECOGNISE PRIVACY PROTECTION ...... 62 
IX CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................... 71 
5 
Abstract 
In the past two years, the law of privacy experienced some revolutionary developments. In New Zealand 
the Court of Appeal affirmed the existence of a tort of privacy and determined the relevant requirements for 
a sucessful claim. In Europe a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights challenged the privacy 
jurisdiction of the States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In both cases celebrities have initiated the discussions and thus, have been the decisive factor for this paper. 
Celebrities have increasingly been the subject of the media. Their recognition as a profit generating value 
led to invasions of their private lives that has called for changes. 
This paper will examine the protection provided for celebrities in New Zealand, Germany and Canada. In 
order to fully understand the approaches taken by the different countries, this paper will introduce the 
emergence of celebrity and attempt to define celebrity. lt will be argued that the influence the right of 
privacy has on the individual and society justifies limitations on press freedom. 
While Germany presently offers the broadest protection for private lives of celebrities, New Zealand 
favours to give more leeway to freedom of expression. This paper suggests that neither of the perceptions 
reaches a consummate balance of the rights to privacy and press freedom. 
As a result, the paper supports the establishment of a privacy tort in eigth of Canada's common law 
provinces that are presently without any protection. It will be reasoned why Canada might be obliged to 
introduce such a tort and the final suggestion pictures a hybrid of the New Zealand and German approach. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and appendices) 
comprises approximately 16.800 words. 
Tort of Invasion of Privacy, or 
Comparison Privacy Law - New Zealand, Germany, Canada or 
Celebrity Rights. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Press in our society is free and aggressive in its newsgathering function, thus a 
conflict is inevitable between the interest of individuals in remaining anonymous, and the 
interest of the media in reporting aspects of people's lives that are deemed newsworthy. 
In particular in recent years, the tabloid press has been pushing the boundaries 
exposing even the most delicate details of private lives of celebrities. In doing so, they 
challenged public figures to appeal to the law for protection. Recent developments 
primarily in Germany and New Zealand but partially also in Canada reveal that the courts 
are prepared to move towards increased privacy protection. 
This paper examines the protection presently provided for celebrities in all three 
countries. It introduces the history of origins including the impact of constitutional 
documents, defines the parameters (as far as available) and outlines the remedies for 
privacy intrusions. 
Further, the paper argues that a comparison of the "privacy laws" reveals that 
Germany and New Zealand took quite different approaches in developing and 
establishing privacy protection. While the former provides for a broad safeguard evolved 
from case law which goes back to the 1950s, the latter just took the first steps towards 
increasing protection by clearly affirming the existence of a privacy tort. However, 
although still in its infancy, the privacy tort definitely lags behind the protection for 
celebrities exercised in Germany. 
Canada on the other hand is still at a starting point and it is hardly predictable how 
much protection celebrities would enjoy. At least eight of Canada's common law 
provinces experience developments that heavily resemble those that took place in New 
Zealand before Hosking, namely individual and fainthearted attempts to move towards a 
privacy tort. It will be argued for the establishment of a tort of invasion of privacy also in 
Canada since privacy is of immense importance for individuals and society. In terms of 
celebrity protection, the paper supports a hybrid of the approaches taken in Germany and 
7 
New Zealand and outlines under which conditions a fair balance between privacy rights 
and press freedom can be achieved in Canada. 
II CELEBRITY 
A The Emergence of Celebrity 
By and large, celebrity is a product of modem society. At least three major 
historical developments are fundamental for the emergence of celebrity. The 
democratisation of society, the decline in religion and the commodification of everyday 
life have all led to the formation of today ' s celebrity culture.2 
Therefore, the generally accepted function of the celebrity argues Rojek, is to fill 
in the blank "created by the decay in the popular belief in the divine right of kings, and 
the death of God." 3 It was during the American Revolution when a shift from the 
ideology of monarchical power to the ideology of the common man took place and 
celebrities replaced the monarchy as the new symbols of recognition and belonging.4 
There are also more radical perceptions concerning the formation of celebrity. On 
the one hand, there are proponents of the theory that celebrity is the outcome of a 
development that started in early Roman times when people already experienced the 
desire for fame. 5 On the other hand, Sckickel6 supports the understanding of celebrity as a 
modern phenomenon that emerged not before the beginning of the 20th century. 
B An Attempt to Define Celebrit/ 
The different notions concerning the emergence of celebrity can be ascribed to 
differing definitions of celebrity. 
2 Chris Rojek Celebrity (Reaktion Books, London , 200 l) 13. 
3 Rojek, above n 2, 13. 
4 Rojek, above n 2, 14. 
5 See for example Leo Braudy The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and its History (Oxford Uni versity Press, 
Oxford, 1986) 10. 
6 Richard Schicke l lmimate Stranger: The Culture of Celebrity in America (Ivan R Dee, Chicago, 1985) 21 . 
7 The word ce lebrity stems from the Latin term celebrem, which means both fame and being thronged. It is 
also re lated to the Engli sh word celerity, meaning swift and the French term cele bre, meaning we ll known 
in public . See Rojek, above n 2, 9. 
In my opinion there exi sts al so a connection to the Latin term ce lebrare which has connotati ons with prai se, 
glorify and ce le bra te. 
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For Schickel, alleging that "there was no such thing as celebrity prior to the 
beginning of the 20th century",8 celebrity separates fame from success and achievement. 
He refers to Mary Pickford who signed the first million dollar film contract on 24 June 
1916 and argues that: 9 
It was at the moment this deal made headlines that reward began to detach itself from 
effort and from intrinsic merit, when the old reasonable correlation between what (and 
how) one did and what one received for doing it became tenuous (and, in the upper 
reaches of show biz, invisible). 
Similar is the concept of the celebrity as "a person who is well-known for their 
well-knownness". 10 As a result celebrity status is gained not for achieving great things 
but rather for differentiation of their personality from those of their competitors in the 
bi . 11 pu 1c arena. 
Notwithstanding these definitions, there are many individuals emerging from 
sports, politics, arts, business, film and even academia who, at least at the outset, gain 
fame for their accomplishments. Thus, special achievements will in the majority of cases 
be the starting point for becoming a celebrity but they cannot be regarded as a compelling 
prereq ui site. 
A further element of celebrity is that the media will pay much greater attention to 
the private lives than the professional lives of the celebrities. Graeme Turner even 
suggests that the shift from reporting on the public role to investigating the private lives 
"map[s] the precise moment a public figure becomes a celebrity." 12 
Rojek treats celebrity as " the attribution of glamourous or notorious status to an 
individual within the public sphere." 13 since it is generally accepted that royalty, movie 
stars, television actors, high-ranking politicians, major-league athletes, directors, 
producers, artists, musicians, authors and journalists as well as gardeners, chefs and 
8 Schickel, above n 6, 21. 
9 Schickel, above n 6, 47. 
10 Daniel Boorstin The Image or What Happened to the American Dream ? (Atheneum, NewYork, 1961) 
58. 
11 Graeme Turner Understanding Celebrity (Sage Publications, London, 2004) 5. 
12 Turner, above n 11, 8. 
n Rojek, above n 2, I 0. 
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interior decorators with their own television shows and finally, mass murderers or victims 
of crimes can be deemed as celebrities 14, He argues that both glamour as a favourable and 
notoriety as an unfavourable recognition form part of celebrity. Thus, the core element of 
celebrity is the "impact on public consciousness" 15, regardless of the positive or negative 
tendencies. 
Furthermore celebrity can be categorised as ascribed, achieved or attributed. 16 In 
terms of ascribed celebrity one might think of Caroline of Monacco, Prince Charles or his 
sons William and Harry. They all have in common the royal lineage that bestows them 
their status. In contrast, achieved celebrity stems from the effort and success individuals 
have reached in public competition. Finally, attributed celebrity is characterised as 
"concentrated representation of an individual as noteworthy or exceptional by cultural 
intermediaries" 
17, notwithstanding special talents or skills. An example for the latter 
category would be the victim of a serious crime. 
Additionally, celebrity represents a commodity in modem society. The definition 
of Wernick provides that: 18 
A star is anyone whose name and fame has been built up to the point where 
reference to them, via mention, mediatized representation or live appearance, can 
serve as a promotional booster in itself. 
While his approach is obviously too narrow, eliding other essential aspects of 
celebrity, his concept, at least, emphasises that the commercial aspect of celebrity should 
not be underestimated. 19 
Finally, to create an exhaustive definition of celebrity, one should have regard to 
the sociological feature of high visibility and the psychological split between private and 
14 
See Richard Haggart Mass Media in a Mass Society: Myth and Reality (Continuum, London, New York, 
2004) 82; Rojek, above n 2, 10-11. 
15 Rojek, above n 2, 10. 
16 Rojek, above n 2, 17-18. 
17 Rojek, above n 2, 18. 
18 
Andrew Wernick Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology and Symbolic Expression (Sage 
Publications, London, 1991) I 06. 
19 
See W A Yan Caenegem "Different Approaches to the Protection of Celebrities against Unauthorised 
Use of their Image in Advertising in Australia, The United States and The Federal Republic of Germany" 
(1990) 12 (12) EIPR 452; Jason ST Kotter " Merchandising Celebrity: A User's Guide to Personality 
Rights" (2002) 16 IPJ Can I. 
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public self of the celebrity. In particular the latter, implying that "the human actor 
presents a 'front' or 'face' to others while keeping a significant portion of the self in 
reserve"20 is characteristic for stars. ' 
If one focuses upon the crucial features and if one rejects extreme categoric 
approaches, a definition of celebrity might read as follows : 
A celebrity is a person who 
a) achieved or simply got ascribed or attributed fame for whatsoever reason; 
b) is therefore attracting more than just short-lived public attention concerning not 
only their public role but also their private lives; 
c) is in terms of his image and name, has a profit generating value and 
d) is highly visible within the mass media notwithstanding the fact that he or she may 
nevertheless withhold or at least try to withhold certain aspects of live from the 
public eye. 
C Conflict of Need for Public Attention and Respect for Privacy 
With the aforementioned definition in mind, one becomes aware of the fact that 
celebrities are mostly products of the mass media. Celebrities live through and by them.2 1 
However, a common complaint of celebrities is that there is less and less respect 
for their private lives. This seems ironic since public attention establishes the basis for 
I b . ?2 ce e nty status.-
Nevertheless, the complaint is legitimate. Although each nation has its own 
independent celebrity structure, they all have in common the interest in the private lives 
of "their" celebrities. 23 To satisfy this increasing interest, almost any kind of media 
20 Rojek, above n 2, 11 . 
21 Yan Caenegem, above n 19, 452. 
22 Rojek, above n 2, 20. 
23 See Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Defining Celebrity (last updated 14 May 2005) 
<hllp://en.wikipedia.org>. While there is also a class of global celebrities, most individuals will be well 
known only in certain territori es. Interestingly, some subnational entities also have their own celebrity 
system, such as Quebec. 
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product covers celebrity issues. In television , internet, print media and especially m 
woman's magazines, celebrity has become a fundamental component.24 
Despite the fact that A-list celebrities, mostly through their public relations 
personnel, have the power to control what is written about them, there remains an area 
where celebrities cannot escape the public eye. 
Magazines like Vanity Fair or People may, in order to generate profit, agree to 
whatever terms celebrities demanded to get the stars to pose for their covers and editorial 
articles. But while " the glossy magazines have given up their right to free speech in 
return for access to celebrities" 25 this barely applies for the everyday appearance of 
celebrities.26 Every move is followed by the media, fans or paparazzi regardless whether 
the celebrity is shopping, running, sunbathing or simply following his or her hobbies. 
And although most celebrities try to insulate their private lives from public scrutiny they 
cannot escape the public eye in total. 
Thus, the crucial question is, how far does the right of freedom of expression go 
and how much weight is given to the individual's privacy especially in relation to gossip? 
Before turning to the different approaches of New Zealand, Canada and Germany 
to solve these problems it might be of help to have regard to both a definition of privacy 
and the influence privacy has on a democratic society and its individuals. 
III PRIVACY 
A Definition of Privacy 
Although modem societies have established a wide range of privacy laws, most of 
those laws merely provide an indication of what privacy is. A definition of the right to 
privacy is missing. 
24 Turner, above n 11, 71. 
25 Toby Young How to Lose Friends and Alienate People ( Little Brown, London , 2001) 333. 
26 Exemptions would probably be made where a magazine aims for a cover deal with a celebrity. In such 
case the editors would not want to alienate the celebrity by publi shing paparazz i photos. 
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In fact, the multitude of attempts to define pnvacy reveals the difficulties 
affiliated with the subject. 
Charles Fried assumed that: 27 
Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; 
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves. The person 
who enjoys privacy is able to grant or deny access to others. 
Similar is the attempt of Jourard who suggests that: 28 
Privacy is an outcome of a person's wish to withhold from others certain 
knowledge as to his past and present experience and action and his intentions for 
the future. The wish for privacy expresses a desire to be an enigma to others or, 
more generally, a desire to control others' perceptions and beliefs vis-a-vis the 
self-concealing person. 
More recently privacy has been devided into three elements. Secrecy, solitude and 
anonymity were the three spheres Gavison had in mind when he established the 
connection between privacy and "the extent to which we are known to others, the extent 
to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of 
others attention." 29 
However, it seems that it is the broad and almost 120 years old phrase of the 
"right to be let alone" that Warren and Brandeis30 took from Cooley's treatise on torts31 
that is both still valid and deemed to cover the concept of privacy best. 32 
B Impact Privacy Has on the Individual 
27 Charles Fried "Privacy" (November 1967-March 1968) 77 Yale U 475, 482. 
28 Sidney M Jourard "Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy" ( 1966) 3 1 L & Contemp Probs 307. 
29 Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale L Rev 42 l , 423. 
30 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193, 195. Their 
article is deemed Lo be the first attempt to establish the recognition of a genera l ri ght of privacy. 
11 Thomas Cooley Torts ( 2 ed 1888) 29 cited in Warren and Brandeis, above n 30, 195. 
12 See Milton R Konvitz "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude'" ( 1966) 31 L & Contemp Probs 
272, 279. 
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To understand the importance and value privacy constitutes for the individual, it 
might be of help to clarify the effects a lack of privacy has on the general well-being of a 
person. Charles Fried assumed that: 33 
[P]rivacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some other 
value, hut that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most 
fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a 
good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without 
privacy they are simply inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or 
the possibility of privacy for their existence. 
He argues that privacy influences love and friendship in different ways but only 
the following aspects are relevant for privacy and its invasion by the media. 
First, it is crucial that one can be intimate with another to become friends or 
lovers. And intimacy means sharing one's emotions, beliefs and actions which are not 
known to everybody due to the right to keep them for oneself. It is by sharing this 
"exclusive" information and by conferring the right not to share them that "privacy 
creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love." 34 Besides gifts of 
property or service, it is the shared intimacy that forms the basis for love and friendship. 
It is hard to imagine that one can be a lover or friend without giving away something of 
him or herself that is not known to the public. Therefore it is important for every human 
being, including celebrities, to maintain a sphere where they can express themselves 
without public cognition. 
Secondly, it will be impossible for individuals to share the same level of intimacy 
with all their friends. The decision to share certain kinds of information with different 
people will create several degrees of intimacy. Thus, the divulgement of information by 
third parties, like the media, might destroy the limited degree of intimacy that was created 
by withholding the respective information.35 
Besides the effects pnvacy has on the relations to our fellow men, it 1s an 
indispensable value also in terms of mental health and well-being. 
3
·
1 Fried, above n 27, 477. 
3
~ Fried, above n 27, 484. 
35 Fried, above n 27, 485. 
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Individuals live in social systems that will provide rules for appropriate behaviour 
depending on age, sex, family position, job and social class. In order to prevent sanctions 
deriving from disobedience, men will conform to the system and the provided roles. 
But when a person continues to stick strictly to social roles that are "inimical to 
the needs of his physical organism"36, he or she will become mentally ill. Therapeutic 
experience has proved that a private place is the precondition for physical and 
psychological health. The individual needs a place for solitude where he or she can 
express and act without fearing external sanctions or feeling "guilt for the discrepancy 
between the way he appears in public and the way he is in private."37 
This applies even more for celebrities. Since they are omnipresent through 
internet, newspapers, biographies, television and radio, they cannot hide their private 
lives from the public eye. The result is that the public self (the self as seen by others) 
often overlaps or dominates the private self and the celebrities experience identity 
confusion or even a clinical or sub-clinical loss of identity.38 
Furthermore, celebrities are often elevated in public esteem. The difficulties 
arising out of the gap between the public and "real" person often contribute to personal 
problems. Therefore, celebrities may struggle to be themselves with their families and 
friends or have poor emotional health causing alcohol or drug abuse.39 
C Impact Privacy Has on a Democratic Society 
Besides the effects privacy has on individuals there is also a remarkable impact it 
has on society at large. Most of the effects are linked with the importance privacy has to 
the well-being of the individuals who form part of society. 
A lack of privacy is undoubtfully helpful to achieve maximum control over 
citizens behaviour and might keep society stable. But the longed for stability may not 
36 Jourard, above n 28, 309. 
37 Jourard, above n 28, 3 l 0. 
38 Roj ek, above n 2, 11 . 
39 
Rojek, above n 2, 20; Wi kipedi a, the free encyclopedia Defining Celebrity (l ast updated 14 May 2005) 
<http:! /en. wi ki pedia.org>. 
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last since non privacy also means that there is little or no individuality. But it is that 
individuality that is fundamental since " the cost to be paid for the ends achieved-in terms 
of lost health, weak commitment to the society, and social stagnation - may be to great."40 
A society whose goal is to endure, must concede its peoples privacy in order to ensure 
that they will "gladly live - not just for material benefits but for the rich experience of 
existence that participation in the society affords."41 
Finally, privacy is indispensable for a societies' substantial progress in art and 
science. Artists, writers, scientists and performers need solitude to explore and develop 
new ideas and in order to tap their full intellectual potential.42 Thus, privacy facilitates 
diversity, which is essential to any pluralistic, democratic society. 
In particular the last-mentioned argument supports the position that " the 
democratic justification for privacy is similar to that of freedom of expression since both 
the free formulation of viewpoints, and their free expression, are necessary to democratic 
political debate". 43 
Nevertheless, due to the conflictive nature of freedom of expression and privacy, 
both rights will regularly clash. While the media naturally fosters freedom of the press 
as part of freedom of expression, the individuals (celebrities) will invoke the right to 
privacy. 
In the following chapters this paper will examine how New Zealand, Canada and 
Germany balance the two legal concepts in particular in relation to celebrities and gossip. 
40 Jourard, above n 28, 3 18. 
41 Jourard, above n 28, 3 1 I. 
42 Jourard, above n 28, 3 14. 
43 John DR Craig " Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens" (1997) 42 
McGill LJ 355, 360. 
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IV LAW OF PRIVACY IN NEW ZEALAND 
In New Zealand, there exists a whole collection of pivacy laws.44 Nevertheless, 
for the purpose of this paper focusing on the rights of celebrities, only the tort of invasion 
of privacy, the privacy principles developed by the Broadcasting Standards Authority and 
specific law covering photographing a person will be of special interest. 
A Provisions Concerning Photographs 
First and foremost, there is no statute law in New Zealand preventing the taking of 
photographs of a person without his or her consent.45 Even publication is not wrongful as 
long as the requirements for another cause of action are not met, for example 
defamation.46 
Exceptions apply for private investigators who commit an offence m taking or 
using a photograph without prior consent.47 
Similar provisions can be found in the Copyright Act 1994 and are of importance 
m cases where celebrities commission photographs. But since any arrangements with 
newspapers and magazines will mostly be covered by negotiated contracts, section 105 of 
the Copyright Act 1994
48 
will only be of relevance where the celebrity needs to deliver 
photographs for official documents such as passport or driving licence. 
44 
The non exhaustive li st includes the Privacy Act 1993, Harassment Act 1997, Crimes Act 1961 , 
Summary Offences Act 1981, Victims' Ri ghts Act 2002, Telecommunications Act 200 I , 
Radiocommunications Act 1989 and the Criminal Records Act 2004. Although these statutes do not 
provide an enforceable right to privacy they do adress at least specific privacy issues. In addition, privacy is 
partly covered by existing causes of action such as trespass, nui sance, breach of confidence, harassment, 
and intentional infliction of emotional harm. See John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New 
Zealand (5 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2005) 234-235, 245, 280-289; Hosking v Ruming 
[2005] I NZLR I, paras 186-192 (CA) Keith J. 
45 Burrows, above n 44, 286. 
46 Burrows, above n 44, 286. 
47 
Private Investigators and Security Guards Act 1974 s 52 (!)(a).This section provides that: (I) Every 
person who, in the course of or in connection with the busi ness of a private investigator,- (a)Takes or 
causes to be taken, or uses or accepts for use, any photograph, .. . without the prior consent in writing of that 
other person, commits an offence. 
48 
Copyright Act 1994. Section I 05 (l) provides that : A person who, for private and domestic purposes, 
corrunissions the taking of a photograph or the making of a film has, where copyright exists in the resulting 
work but is owned by some other person, the right-
(a) Not to have copies of the work issued to the public ; and 
(b) Not to have the work exhibited or shown in public; and 
(c) Not to have the work broadcast or included in a cable programme. 
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Recently, there have also emerged considerations concerning visual records of a 
person taken in situations involving nudity, partial nudity, or physical or bodily 
intimacy.49 Thus, it is recommended that the Crimes Act 1961 should be complemented 
by new criminal offences containing provisions that making, publishing and possession 
of a voyeuristic recording are illegal.so 
But as long as no such statute is enacted, it must be examined whether the tort of 
invasion of privacy covers the taking of photographs and other intrusions into the private 
lives of celebrities. 
B The Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
Although some publications may g1Ye the impression that a privacy tort has 
suddenly appeared from nowhere,s 1 this is not so. New Zealand has recognised a privacy 
tort for at least ten years, developed by several High Court decisions.s2 
The significance of the Hosking decisions3 is represented by the fact that, finally, 
the Court of Appeal unmistakably affirmed the privacy tort. Interestingly, the three 
judges favouring the existence of the privacy torts4 are also members of New Zealand's 
new Supreme Court, which replaced the Privy Council last year. Thus although not in 
form, the case effectively has the backing of the highest court in New Zealand's court 
h. h SS 1erarc y. 
49 See Burrows, above n 44, 286. 
50 New Zealand Law Commission Intimate Covert Filming ( ZLC SP 15, Wellington, 2004) para 4.15-
4.64. Due to such an amendment celebrities would be safe from being depicted while engaged in sexual or 
an intimate bodily activity such as using a public toilet. Furthermore, visual recording of a person being 
nude or having his or her sexual organs, pubic area, buttocks, or her breast or underwear exposed would be 
prohibited. 
51 See Joanne Black "Age of Intrusion" (25 June 2005) New Zealand Listener, 14. The article states that the 
Hosking decision "effectively created a new law." 
52 Burrows, above n 44, 250. The first general consideration of a stand-alone conunon law action for an 
invasion of privacy took place in 1986 where, in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [ 1986) 2 NZLR 716 
(HC), the litigant sought to prevent the publication of former convictions. Further steps were taken in 
Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [ 1993] I NZLR 415 (HC), P v D [2000] 2 ZLR 59 land L v G [2002) NZAR 
495. 
53 Hosking v Runting, above n 44. 
54 Gault and Blanchard JJ delivered a joint judgment while Tipping J wrote a judgment of his own. 
Although he is in general agreement with the former judges, certain variations arise since Tipping J applies 
to some of the elements lesser standards. The differences between the joint judgement and that of Tipping J 
will be discussed below. 
55 Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A Privacy Tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort L Rev 5, 6. 
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The Hosking case was concerned with the publication of photographs of the 
appellant's children. They had been taken while the twin daughters were pushed in their 
stroller by their mother in a busy shopping mall. Although the claim was rejected, the 
joint majority judgement of Gault P and Blanchard J stated two fundamental 
requirements for a tort of privacy:56 
l The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; and 
2 Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive 
to an objective reasonable person. 
Although the tort is obviously in an early stage of development and there is only a 
very small number of decisions concerning this matter, the next chapters will closely 
examine the several elements of the tort in order to determine the possible outcome for 
celebrities. 
1 The several elements of the tort of privacy 
Before turning to the several elements it should be emphasised that the Court 
stated explicitly that the privacy tort is concerned only with the "wrongful publicity given 
to private lives" and not with the "unreasonable intrusion into a person's solitude or 
seclusion."57 
(a) A reasonable expectation of privacy 
Although all three maj01ity judges agreed that the question of whether a person 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy forms the first ingredient of the tort, it is only 
Tipping J who makes an attempt to render this element more precisely when he suggests 
that "[t]he necessary expectation can arise from the nature of the infonnation or material 
or the circumstances in which the defendant came into possession of it, or both."58 
56 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
57 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 118 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
58 Hosking v Ru11ting, above n 44, para 249 Tipping J . 
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Tipping J' s definition is quite broad and therefore does not exclude a reasonable 
expectation of privacy only because photographs were taken in a public place. 59 
Nevertheless, it will be more difficult for celebrities to succeed with a claim since the 
Court also noted that:60 
The right to privacy is not automatically lost when a person is a public figure, but 
hi s or her reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to many areas of life will be 
correspondingly reduced as public status increases. Involuntary public figures may 
also experience a lessening of expectations of privacy, but not ordinarily to the 
extent of those who willingly put themselves in the spotlight. 
Therefore, it can be considered certain that even among celebrities different 
measures will apply - depending on whether or not the celebrity intentionally sought the 
public. 
(b) Public disclosure 
Since the objective of the privacy tort is to prevent the widespread publicity of 
very personal and private matters, any publication in a newspaper, television or radio will 
fulfil the test. 61 
(c) Offensive and objectionable nature of the publicity 
While it was not always clear whether the facts itself or their disclosure must be 
offensive and objectionable62 in Hosking the Court of Appeal favoured explicitly the 
latter one by stating that: 63 
59 See also Burrows, above n 44, 251. 
60 Hoski11g v Rw1ting, above n 44, para 121 , Gault P and Blanchard J . 
6 1 Burrows, above n 44, 251-252. Due to this element the tort excludes situations where a third person 
gathers offensive information to keep them for his or her own entertainment rather than publi shing it. 
Therefore, stalkers or aggressive fans would not meet the requirements of the tort though it is questionable 
whether such conduct is less invasive. evertheless, in very serious cases there will probable be an action 
for trespass and intentional inflicting of mental suffering and emotional distress. 
62 See Bradley v Wi11 g1111t Fi/111s Ltd, above footnote 52, 424. In thi s decision Gallen J assumed that the facts 
must be highly offensive and objectionable rather than their publication. 
63 Hosking v Ru11ting, above n 44, para 127 Gault P and Blanchard J . 
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We consider that the test of highly offensive to the reasonable person is 
appropriate. It relates, of course, to the publicity and is not part of the test of 
whether the information is private. 
Two of the majority judges assume that only publicity highly offensive can meet 
the requirements for the tort. Therefore, "even extensive publicity, of matters which, 
although private, are not really sensitive"64 is not sufficient. Only "publicity that is truly 
humiliating and distressful or otherwise harmful to the individual concemed" 65 can 
justify a right of action. 
Since the threshold set by the joint judgment is quite high, celebrities are 
definitely better protected by the standards Tipping J applies. Instead of demanding a 
highly offensive publication, he lowers the benchmark and suggests that it will only be 
"necessary for the degree of offence and harm to be substantial."66 He justifies his lesser 
standard by arguing that in certain circumstances it might be unduly restrictive to require 
a highly offensive publicity and that a substantial degree of offence is more flexible .67 
(d) Private facts 
Finally, the publication must concern private facts. Given that any definition of 
what constitutes a private fact is very difficult, the joint judgment states in general that 
"private facts are those that may be known to some people, but not to the world at 
large."68 Since this is a very broad definition, the Court finds the comments of Gleeson 
CJ in ABC v Lenah Game Meats 69 also cited by the English Court of Appeal in 
Campbetz7°, very helpful: 71 
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is 
not. .. Certain kinds of information about a person, such as information relating to 
health, personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as 
may certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying contemporary 
64 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 126 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
65 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 126 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
66 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 256 Tipping J . 
67 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 256 Tipping J. 
68 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 119 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
69 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
7° Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] I All ER 224 (CA). 
71 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 119 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
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standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be 
unobserved. 
On the other hand, facts such as criminal convictions72, ownership of land and 
marriage or divorce (at least as long the public procedure is concerned) are public facts.73 
However, there is a large area of uncertainty between what is necessarily public 
and what is necessarily private and the question of whether there is a private fact will 
always be case specific.74 
(e) Public interest 
Legitimate public interest is not an element of the tort itself but a defence to it. 
The burden of proof lies with the defendant.75 Although the Hoskings tried to persuade 
the Court that commercially motivated speech of a gossipy nature deserved less 
protection than political or artistic speech, the Court refused to adopt special categories of 
speech. Instead, it prefers "an approach that takes into account in each individual case 
community norms, values and standards."76 Additionally, the Court states that: 77 
A matter of general interest or curiosity would not, in our view, be enough to 
outweigh the substantial breach of privacy harm the tort presupposes. The level of 
legitimate public concern would have to be such as outweighs the level of harm 
likely to be caused. For example, if the publication was going to cause a major risk 
of serious physical injury or death ... , a very considerable level of legitimate public 
concern would be necessary to establish the de fence. 
Matters relating to public health, economy, safety, the detection of crime and 
national security are clearly covered by legitimate public concem.78 In contrast, publicity 
72 In respect of criminal convictions one should bear in mind that these general public facts can become 
fivate again overtime, see Tucker, above footnote 52. 
3 Burrows, above n 44, 252. 
74 Tobin, Rosemary Tobin "Case Note: Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Clause: The Tort of Invasion of 
Privacy in New Zealand" (2004) 12 Torts Ll 95, 109. 
75 Hosking v R1111ti11g, above n 44, para 129 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
76 Hosking v Rimting, above n 44, para 135 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
77 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 134 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
78 Burrows, above n 44, 255. 
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that "becomes morbid and sensational prymg into private lives for its own sake" will 
definitely not constitute a defence.79 
(f) Privacy rights of celebrities' children 
Although the Court of Appeal decision in Hosking deals in depth with the general 
recognition of a tort of privacy, the starting point was always the privacy rights of the 
Hosking children. 
The main question was whether there should be a difference between celebrity 
adults and their underage children. The joint judgment of the majority begins with 
examining the international instruments which bind New Zealand to protect the rights of 
children. 
As a party to the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child 1989 
(UNCROC)80, New Zealand is subject to Article 16 and 3 of the convention. 81 Although 
the court accepts that these provisions oblige the state to give special consideration to the 
rights of children, it nevertheless states that the generally required elements of the tort are 
sufficient to protect children since the flexibility of the criteria accommodates the special 
l b·1· f · 82 vu nera 1 1ty o mmors. 
The judges are of the view that it would be "unrealistic and unnecessary to 
consider a legal prohibition against the publication of all photographs depicting children 
without parental consent".83 In contrast, privacy of celebrities' children is only violated 
79 Hosking v Runting, above n 58, para 135 Gault P and Blanchard J, refe rring top 391 of the Restatement 
of Torts. 
80 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN doc. A/44/49 (1989) (UNCROC) 
adopted by GA Res. 44/25, annex 44, UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49). The Convention has become the most 
widely ratified of all human rights treaties, with 192 States Parties. As of l4September 2004, only Somalia 
and the United States of America have not ratified the Convention. 
81 UNCROC, Article 16 states that: I. No child shal l be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and 
reputation.2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Article 
3 states that: I. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall 
be a primary consideration. 
82 Hosking v Ru11ti11g, above n 44, para 145 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
83 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 144 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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where a person of ordinary sensibilities would the publication consider highly offensive 
or objectionable "even bearing in mind that young children are involved."84 
The further remarks of the joint judgement indicate that a publication amounts to 
breach of privacy only, if there is a real risk of physical harm caused for instance by 
kidnapping or other wrongdoing. 85 The pure concern that the wellbeing of the children 
might be influenced negatively due to a constant fear of media intrusion is not sufficient 
to outweigh freedom of expression.86 
(g) Summary: Outcome of the Hosking decision for celebrities 
Firstly, celebrities do have a right to privacy even if this right can be limited 
depending on the extent to which they sought the public eye. 
Secondly, although the decision notes explicitly that "the law in New Zealand did 
not recognise a tortious cause of action in privacy based upon the publication of 
photographs taken in a public place"87 , it does not mean that photographs of a celebrity or 
their family members cannot attract the privacy tort. As long as the several requirements 
of the tort are fulfilled, even the taking of photographs in a public street might give a 
claim. 
In Hosking the claim was rejected because of both the fact that the photographs of 
the children did not include any private facts and that an intended publication would not 
be considered highly offensive. The several elements of the tort need to be fulfilled to 
grant damages or injunctions whether celebrities themselves or their underage children 
are involved. The courts do not differentiate between adults and minors as they assume 
that the tort elements accommodate the interests and needs of both. 
However, as the tort of invasion of privacy is relatively new and the Hosking 
decision gives only general statements in terms of the requirements, earlier cases from 
8
~ Hosking v Runti11g, above n 44, para 165 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
85 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 163 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
86 Hosking v Runti11g, above n 44, para 161-163 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
87 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, l. 
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familiar jurisdictions might be of help. They could reveal rough guidelines on 
circumstances that might constitute a tortious claim also in New Zealand. 
C Important Australian and English Cases as Possible Guidelines 
In Bathurst CC v Saban88 Young J emphasised that the publication of photographs 
depicting someone in a situation of embarrassment or humiliation could impose an 
invasion of privacy. He stated that relief could be granted to a person:89 
that: 92 
[W]ho complained that someone had taken a photograph of him in a shockingly 
wounded condition after a road accident 90 ... or that she had been standing 
innocently over the air vent in a fun house and someone had photographed her 
with her skirts blown up. 
Almost ten years ago in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire91 Law J noted 
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no authority 
a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the 
photograph would amount to a breach of privacy ... 
For the question of whether a person is engaged in a private activity, one should 
have a look at the decisions of Peck v United Kingdom93 and Campbell v MGN. 94 The 
88 Bathurst v Saban ( 1985) 2 NSWLR 704. 
89 Bathurst v Saban, above n I OJ , 708 Young J. 
90 See also CD v TVJ Network Services Ltd 2000-141-143 where footage of a car accident was used in a 
comedy show although the complainant had expressed her wish not to be filmed. She was clearly identified 
and was shown bleeding from an obvious but apparently superficial injury. The BSA held that the fact of 
the accident and detail s of the injuries were public facts and that the accident had occurred and being 
filmed in a public place. Thus, no private facts were revealed. However, the BSA held that Private Principle 
(iii), protecting the interest in solitude and sec lusion was violated. 
Contrast Convey v TVJ Network Services Ltd 1996-115, where the Broadcast Standards Authority stated 
that road accidents are a matter of public interest. Due to that defe nce the footage of a victim of the 
accident was held not to meet the requirements for a breach of privcy. 
91 Hel/ewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire (1995] 4 All ER 473. 
92 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire, above n l 03, 807 Law J. 
93 Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 13 BHRC 669 (ECHR). 
94 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL). It must be emphasised that in the 
United Kingdom a common law privacy tort has not been recogni sed yet. Instead, the English Courts 
developed the equitable cause of action of breach of confidence to prevent the publication of private 
information in circumstances like the above. But since the different approaches do not change the general 
recognition of privacy protection the cases are still a helpful guideline. This is supported by the fact that the 
aforementioned English cases are also cited and di sc ussed in Hosking. See Hosking v Runti11g, above n 44 
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former case indicated that Mr Peck should have been entitled to remedies since he was 
filmed on a public street, holding a knife that he had used to attempt suicide. The latter 
case involved supermodel Naomi Campbell, who recently underwent therapy to 
overcome drug problems. The Mirror published an article revealing Campbell's 
addiction; the fact that she was seeking therapy; the fact that the therapy was at Narcotics 
Anonymous; details of her therapy; and a photograph of her leaving a meeting of 
Narcotics Anonymous.95 
It was beyond dispute that all five categories of information were private and 
protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).96 
Nevertheless, it was accepted by the plaintiff that she could not prevent the publication of 
both the fact that she was addicted and that she received treatment since she had falsely 
denied a drug problem in the past. Hence, the complaint was restricted to the fact that she 
was treated at Narcotics Anonymous, the details of the therapy, and the photograph 
outside the meeting. 97 The House of Lord held in a three-to-two decision that Mrs 
Campbell was entitled to remedies as far as NA, treatment details and the photograph 
were concerned. Their Lordships balanced the right to private life with the right to 
freedom of expression, provided by Article 10 ECHR. As a result, the majority held that 
the public's need to know the details of the treatment was lower than the need to prevent 
a disclosure in order to assure the appellant's recovery.98 
Because there are only few court decisions in New Zealand concerning the 
privacy rights of public figures, it might be of help to have a closer look also at cases 
dealt with by the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) and the Press Council (PC).99 
It is widely accepted that the BSA and PC have developed considerable expertise 
m dealing with privacy complaints, using their own privacy principles for guidance. 100 
para 53 where Gault and Blanchard JJ stale that "relevant decisions ... can be important in helping develop 
the New Zealand jurisprudence" and that" Peck is instructive". 
95 See Arye Schreiber "Campbell v MGN Ltd" (2005) 27 (4) EIPR 159. 
96 Article 8 (1) ECHR provides that: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
97 Schreiber, above n 95, 159. 
98 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, above n 107, 457. 
99 While the former, under the Broadcasting Act 1989, has jurisdiction to deal with complaints that a 
broadcaster breached an individual's privacy the latter has no legislative foundation and therefore no 
legally enforceable power. 
100 See Burrows, above n 44, 257. For the privacy principles of the BSA and PC see Appendices I, ll. 
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Since the privacy principles of the BSA have been affirmed by the High Court101 and the 
principles of the PC were at least part of the considerations of the Court of Appeal in 
Hosking 102, it is advisable for the media to be aware of their decisions. Not only do the 
BSA's privacy principles include the elements of the tort as established in Hosking, they 
are partially even wider and thus relevant to the developing tort of privacy .103 
D Privacy Decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
Although the BSA has a broad selection of decisions referring to privacy, only 
three of them concern celebrities and are of further interest. 
In the first decision 104 Mr Lee, a gospel minister and former Member of 
Parliament was shown in an episode of Private Investigators on TV One. The footage 
included the arriving of Mr Lee for a prayer meeting at a house where a private 
investigator was in the process of recovering goods from its occupants. The complainant 
alleged that the broadcast breached his privacy since it was outrageous and very 
damaging to his credibility and character. Mr Lee claimed a breach of privacy because he 
was identified and named in the programme although he was not involved in the 
wrongdoing which led to the filming and his arrival was by sheer chance. 
The authority refused to uphold the complaint and stated that: 105 
[T]he footage was capable of having the pejorative inference drawn by viewers 
that Mr Lee was, in some manner, tainted by association with the matter being investigated in the 
item. However, it [BSA] considers that this is not the only possible interpretation. In these 
circumstances, the Authority is not prepared to conclude ... that the facts about Mr Lee ... were 
' highly offensive and objectionable' as required to constitute a breach of Privacy Principle (i). 
Another decision concerns Michael Laws, who was an adviser to the New 
Zealand First political party .106 Due to the resignation of two candidates from that party 
one month before the General Election, 3 National News covered the subject. Given that 
both candidates had criticised the influence of Mr Laws as party adviser, the footage 
101 See TV] Network Services Ltd v Broadcasting Standards Awhority [ 1995] 2 NZLR 720 (HC). 
102 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 198 Keith J . 
103 See Burrows, above n 44, 257. 
104 Graeme Lee v Television New Zealand Ltd 2000-133/ 134. 
105 Graeme Lee v Television New Zealand Ltd, above n 104, The Authority's Findings. 
106 Michael Laws v TV3 Network Services Ltd 1996-024. 
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started with picturing Mr Laws at his front door wearing nothing but his nightgown. The 
programme continues to state that Mr Laws refused an interview at that time but ansered 
questions later that day (this interview was broadcasted as well). 
Again, the BSA declined to uphold the privacy complaint. The reasons given by 
the authority are entirely based on principle (vi) which deals with the public interest as 
defence to a privacy complaint. The BSA emphasised the fact that "the symbiotic 
relationship between the media and politicians was approaching in mid September a level 
of intensity" 107 that: 108 
[I]n this very current issue meant that persistent approaches from the media were 
not unreasonable, and indeed, were to be expected. The Authority considers that 
people such as Mr Laws, who are experienced in public life and involved in issues 
of high public interest, can be expected to deal with robust persistence on the part 
of the media that might otherwise be unacceptable. 
Finally, the BSA was concerned with a complaint regarding Dr Morgan Fahey, a 
City Councillor and a doctor in general practice. 109 TV3 had first screened a programme 
including accusations of sexual and professional misconduct. As a result, several former 
female patients contacted TV3 and affirmed the allegations. One woman even wished to 
confront Dr Fahey face to face. Equipped with a hidden camera, she visited her former 
doctor at his surgery and confronted him with her accusations. 
The BSA held that the allegations of sexual and professional misconduct were 
private facts which a reasonable person would consider highly offensive and 
objectionable. 
Nevertheless, the BSA repeatedly considered the public interest to provide a 
ff. . d + · h 110 su 1c1ent e1ence stating t at: 
107 Michael Laws v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 106. 
108 Michael Laws v TVJ Network Services Ltd, above n 106. 
109 William De Hart, Lynda Cameron, P Wand P M Cotter v TV] Network Services Ltd 2000-108, 2000-
109, 2000-110, 2000-111, 2000-112, 2000- I 3. The complainants filed 2 complaints each. Besides there 
allegations concerning privacy they also claimed a violation of almost all the Authority Standards Gl-G7, 
G 12, G 14-G 20 and V 16. 
110 William De Hart, Lynda Cameron. P Wand PM Cotter v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 109, The 
Authority's Findings on Privacy. 
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Dr Fahey was a well-known Christchurch identity - a practising doctor who was 
standing in the Christchurch local body elections as a candidate for mayor - and 
serious allegations had been made about him. The Authority finds that it justified 
the invasion of Dr Fahey's privacy, and affords a complete defence to TV3. 
E Privacy Principles of the Press Council 
With regard to the PC, there have been 36 privacy complaints in recent years, 
even though, only two concern celebrities. 
The first case involved John Burke, the Mayor of Porirua. 111 In 1998 he planned a 
trip to Israel as President of Sister Cities New Zealand. The Evening Post interviewed Mr 
Burke in this matter and considered the publication of the article. In the past, Mr Burke's 
wife had become the victim of offensive letters sent to her while her husband was 
overseas. That was the reason why Mr Burke asked the reporter not to publish the item. 
He also sent a letter to the Evening Post again emphasising why the article could 
be of harm for him and his family. In return, this letter was abridged and published. Mr 
Burke alleged an unfair treatment by the Evening Post provoked by the abridgement and 
publication of the letter to the editor. 
The PC denied upholding the complaint explaining that: 112 
The Council considered that the Evening Post was entitled to publish details of Mr 
Burke's travel arrangements. As a city mayor Mr Burke is undoubtedly a 
significant public figure and his trip was newsworthy on an aspect of his duties 
regardless of how it was funded. The Council had sympathy with his wife's 
situation but felt that the solution to her problem did not lie with the newspaper. 
The second and certainly more distinctive case took place in 2003 when Andrew 
Beck, a Wellington barrister, filed a complaint against New Zealand Woman's 
Weekly. 113 
111 John Burke v The Evening Post, case number 709. 
11 2 John Burke v The Evening Post, above n 111. 
11 3 Andrew Beck v NZ Woman 's Weekly, case number 946. 
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The woman's magazine had run a story focusing on how Mrs Beck deals with 
both children and legal career after the divorce from the complainant. The article had 
mentioned Mr Beck several times and caused him to allege a violation of his private life 
publishing "salacious details" about his former marriage. 
Although, the PC refused to uphold the complaint11 4, it made a clear statement 
concerning the responsibilities of the media in dealing with private matters. To begin 
with, the Council confirmed that though the genre of woman's magazines generally 
depends "on the personal stories of its readers as well as of celebrities" that it "does not 
absolve magazine journalists from acting ethically or in the best journalistic 
traditions". 115 And in its final part of the decision the PC found that journalists must: 
[C]arefully consider who might be affected by the human-interest 
they feature - in other words, who might suffer collateral damage -
and whether anyone else's views might therefore need to be sought. 
The Council believes this is particularly important where children are 
involved. 
F General Outcome for Celebrities: Summary 
The discussed cases are unfortunately only of limited help. Barthurst CC v Saban 
sheds further light on the question what kind of "publicity is truly humiliating and 
distressful". 11 6 According to the Australian authority, the disclosure of photos that depict 
celebrities with their underwear or sensitive body parts exposed would be an invasion. It 
is very likely that this perception will be adopted by New Zealand's courts since the Law 
Commission already introduced identical considerations. 
In terms of car accidents, mentioned in the same decision, the outcome is less 
predictable. Interestingly , the New Zealand courts will have to decide this specific matter 
soon since Mr and Mrs Andrews are suing TVNZ. They both have been involved in a car 
accident on a motorway and scenes from the road crash were shown in a reality TV show. 
114 The PC stated that the re ferences in the article were not unduly intrusive. 
11 5 Andrew Beck v NZ Woman ·s Weekly, above n 113. 
11 6 This term was used by the j o int judgment in Hosking v Ru111i11g, above n 44, para 126 Gault P and 
Blane hard J. 
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Relying on the Hosking decision they seek damages for the invasion of their privacy. 
However, two cases decided by the BSA suggest that the courts will deny an invasion of 
privacy. In both Convey v TV3 Network Services Ltd and CD of Queenstown v TV3 
Network Services Ltd the BSA held that road accidents are public, not private facts and of 
public interest. The latter decision was upheld only on the ground of Privacy Principle 
(iii) which deals with the interest in solitude and conclusion and is definitely not part of 
the privacy tort. 117 
Nevertheless, since the footage of Princess Diana' s fatal car accident provoked 
extreme public disgust, it is conceivable that the courts apply another standard. They 
could argue that the disclosure of injuries also concerns information relating to health. As 
mentioned above, such information would be identified as private. 118 
The Hellewell, Peck and Campbell decisions suggest that the publication of facts 
concerning the mental well-being such as drug or alcohol abuse, depression, receiving 
therapy or suicide attempts would be enough reason for a claim. 
The BSA decision, assessing the complaint by Mr Lee, indicates that the element 
of "highly offensiveness" will probably receive a very narrow interpretation. In fact, the 
BSA assumed that a publication, although it led to humiliation and distress on the part of 
the complainant, may not fulfil the tort's conditions if the facts could have been 
interpreted differently by the public (meaning in a way that would not be humiliating or 
harmful). 
Finally, the complaints concerning Mr Laws, Dr Fahey and John Burke reveal that 
politicians have a much lesser expectation of privacy. Publications of matters that might 
generally held unacceptable will be lawful because they will usually be of high public 
interest. 
11 7 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 118 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
11 8 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 119 Gault P and Blanchard J 
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G Remedies Provided for an Invasion of Privacy 
Public figures will be most tempted to claim injunctive relief in order to prevent 
publication. The central argument is that once an item is run by the media it is in the 
public eye and cannot be rescinded. On the other hand, the media favour granting 
damages rather than being subject to prior restraints. They argue with the importance 
attached to freedom of expression. 
The joint judgment tends toward the media's concept, ascertaining that the 
traditional approach has been generally reluctant to grant injunctions and that the current 
position is that: 119 
[A]n injunction to restrain publication in the face of an alleged interference with 
privacy will only be available where there is compelling evidence of most highly 
offensive intended publicising of private information and there is little legitimate 
public concern in the information. ln most cases, damages will be considered an 
adequate remedy. 
Tipping J agrees in general that damages have priority but lowers the benchmark 
insofar as he declares injunctions possible "in cases which are both severe in likely effect 
d I . 1 · k 1 "J?O an c ear m 1 e y outcome. -
Regardless of which criteria one is about to follow, it is certain that the threshold 
for injunctions is high and that the courts will be more likely to grant damages unless 
. 1 . . h · J?I excepttona circumstances require ot erw1se. -
H Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the Tort of Privacy 
It is also of special interest for this paper to examine the Hosking decision 
concerning the question of whether and how the court applied the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
in finally establishing the tort of privacy. When discussing such instrument one must be 
aware of the fact that it's original function is to protect the individual from direct 
11 9 Hosking v R11nti11g, above n 58, para 158 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
120 Hoski11g v Runting, above n 44, para 258 Tipping J. 
121 Besides the courts, the BSA has jurisdiction to grant remedies for an intrusion of privacy. However, the 
authority can grant damages up to$ 5000 only. 
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interference by the state. 122 The vertical effect implies that the state has to respect the 
rights bestowed upon the individual by the BORA and must not infringe these claims 
unless it is justified according to section 5.123 
In cases like the present one, where only private parties are involved, the main 
purpose of such instrument, namely balancing the disparity of powers between 
individuals and the state, has less relevance. 
Nevertheless, there are convincing arguments why a human rights instruments 
may have a horizontal effect, that is to be applied also between private parties. 124 
Maybe the strongest one is that there are occasions imaginable where private 
actors "have the capacity to infringe upon the human rights of individual persons just as 
much as a public actor can". 125 
In terms of media, this is comprehensible quite easily . The publication of, for 
example, a health record by a newspaper or broadcaster can definitely do more harm than 
the possibility of easy access to such records saved with the Ministry of Health. 126 
In Hosking, the judges as far as they discussed the issue at all, took very different 
views concerning the impact of the BORA when deciding whether to create a new 
common law tort. This is very unfortunate since no conclusive answer has been given yet 
to this important question. One reason might be that the BORA is quite new since it was 
enacted only in 1990. Nevertheless, the broad and detailed discussions in other 
jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France and Germany 
would have indicated reaching satisfying results faster and easier. That applies even more 
so, since the judges considered foreign case law, which examines Charter or Constitution 
1 . . l 121 va ues mtens1ve y. 
122 Andrew Geddis "The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
R1111ti11g ( 2004) NZLR 681 , 682. 
123 Geddis, above n 122, 683. 
124 See genera II y Geddis, above n 122, 684. 
125 Geddis, above n 122, 684. 
126 owadays, the di sclosure of such information by public bodies is prohibited by the Privacy Act 1993. 
127 For example Les Editions Vice- Versa Inc v Aubry (1998) 157 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC) and Katz v United 
States (I 967) 389 US 347. Thi s cases and their approach will be di scussed below. 
33 
The joint judgment of the majority addresses the matter in short128 stating that 
"developments in the common law must be consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights Act" but "are not precluded merely because they might 
encroach upon those rights and freedoms." 129 As long as the encroachment is justified 
according to section 5 of the BORA, the courts are free to develop the law. Gault J 
continues to assume that although freedom of expression is of fundamental importance, it 
is not an absolute right. Therefore, "it could could not be contended that limits imposed 
to give effect to rights declared in international covenants to which New Zealand is a 
party cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 130 Such rights 
are included in Article 17 ICCPR and Article 16 UNCROC providing for privacy. 
Resorting to the international treaties is obviously due to the judges' notion that privacy, 
in contrast to freedom of expression, is not addressed in the BORA. 131 
Although the reasoning reveals that the two judges are prepared to accept a certain 
influence of the BORA between private parties, they expressly clarify that "the complex 
question of the extent to which the Courts are to give effect to the rights and freedoms 
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act in disputes between private litigants" is not the subject 
of their judgement. 
Tipping J comes from a similar starting point when stating that: 132 
The Bill of Ri ghts is designed to operate as between citizen and state. Nevertheless 
it will often be appropriate for the values which are recognised in that context lo 
inform the development of the common law in its function of regulating 
relationships between citizen and citizen. 
But in contrast to the remaining majority judges, he is of the view that not only 
freedom of expression but also privacy is contained in the BORA. He states that: 133 
My present point is that the values that underpin s 21 and which are reinforced by 
New Zealand's international obligations can, by reasonable analogy, be extended 
128 Only 6 out of 174 paragraphs include statements relating to the impact of the BORA, see para 11 I- l 16 
Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
129 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 111 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
130 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 113- l 14 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
13 1 Geddis notes that it is somewhat ironically to resort to the international treaties though New Zealand' s 
Parliament had chosen not to act on these commitments and implement privacy into the BORA. 
132 Hosking v Runting, above n 58, para 229 Tipping J. 
133 Hosking v Runting, above n 58, para 226 Tipping J. 
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to unreasonable intrusions into personal privacy which may not strictly amount to 
search and seizure. 
Unfortunately, he too does not state why the rights provided by the BORA should 
be applicable between private parties. 
Keith J and Anderson P, as the minority, consider the impact of the BORA 
differently. They refuse to recognise a privacy tort since "freedom of expression requires 
greater justification than that a reasonable person would be wounded in their feelings by 
the publication of true information of a personal nature" . 134 That is mainly due to the fact 
that privacy cannot be considered protected equally to freedom of expression or as 
A d P · 135 n erson puts 1t: 
An analysis which treats that value [privacy] as if it were a right and the s 14 of the 
NZBORA right as if it were a value, or treats both as if they were only values 
when one is more than that is, I think, erroneous. 
The minority 1s of the view that statutory and common law provide already 
sufficient protection. Should one nevertheless call for an extension, it must be left to 
Parliament rather than the courts to answer these demands. 
V LAW OF PRIVACY IN GERMANY 
Unlike New Zealand which has only recently developed its privacy protection, 
Germany is a few steps ahead. This might be due to two reasons . 
Firstly, the enactment of a Bill of Rights occurred more than 40 years earlier than 
in New Zealand. On the 23rd May 1949 the Constitution of Bonn was adopted of which 
the Bill of Rights formed a main part. 136 Secondly, the experiences during World War II, 
in particular violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Nazi regime, 
led to the enactment of provisions excluding "any possibility of a similar situation ever 
b . d ,, 137 emg repeate . 
134 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 267 Anderson P. 
135 Hosking v Runting, above n 44, para 265 Anderson P. 
136 Basic Law (23 May 1949). 
137 Wolfgang Heyde Jusrice and rhe Law in the Federal Republic of Germany (C F Mueller Juri stischer 
Verlag, Heidelberg, 1994) 3 
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In this context, of substantial value 1s article 5 of the Basic Law, protecting 
freedom of expression: 138 
5 ( !) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by 
speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible 
sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts 
and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
On the other hand, the Basic Law also protects the colliding value of privacy. 
A The Recognition of the Right to Privacy 
It was the general protection of human dignity and personality which are provided 
in articles 2 (1) and 1 (1) Basic Law that have been the starting point for German case 
law to consider privacy issues. Articles 1 and 2 read as follows: 139 
l (I) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be 
the duty of all state authority. 
2 (l) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in 
so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the 
constitutional order or the moral code. 
The first opportunity that German courts were concerned with privacy matters 
was in 1954, when the Federal Supreme Court gave its judgment in the Schacht 
decision. 140 The court was concerned with the question of whether or not a general 
personality right exists. 
The plaintiff had set up a foreign trade bank and was the subject of an article 
published by a newspaper. The item concerned the plaintiff's political activities during 
the regime of the National Socialists and in the aftermath of the war. The plaintiff' s 
counsel wrote a letter to the newspaper seeking rectification of the article. But instead of 
carrying out conections, the newspaper published the counsel's letter under the Letters 
from Readers column. The plaintiff sought revocation alleging an infringement of his 
personality rights since the publication of the counsel ' s letter was not authorised and 
138 German Basic Law, article 5 ()). 
139 German Basic Law, articles I (1) and 2 (1). 
1
~0 Schacht BGHZ ( 1954) 13, 334. 
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intended only for the editorial staff. Therefore, the question for the court was whether 
one's personality right prohibits the publication of letters or other private notes without 
the consent of the writer. 
In its reasoning the Federal Court commenced by stating that in the past the 
German legal system did not contain any provisions providing a general personality 
right. 141 However, the court continues to state that: 142 
After the Basic Law recognises the dignity of man (art I) and the right to the 
free development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code (art 2), the 
general personality right must be regarded as a constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental right. 
The Federal Court upheld the claim and granted revocation of the letter. 
Four years later, the same court confirmed this decision in Herrenreiter143 , a case 
where a show jumper sought damages for the usage of his image in a sexual potency drug 
advertisement. The court decided in favour for the plaintiff and held that "the general 
constitutional right to one's personality also possesses validity within the framework of 
the civil law and enjoys the protection of section 823 (1) BGB (German Civil Code)." 144 
B The Horizontal Effect of the Basic Law 
While the Federal Court took it for granted that the personality right is a right 
protected by section 823 I of the German Civil Code even between private parties, it was 
not until the Constitutional Court decision of Luth 145 that a court explicitly addressed the 
application of constitutional rights as between private actors. As aforementioned, human 
rights instruments are generally meant to govern the relationship between the state and its 
citizens. In line with the general notion, the Constitutional Court affirmed that the main 
141 Schacht, above n 140,337 . 
142 Schacht, above n 140, 338. 
143 Herrenreiter BGHZ ( 1958) 26, 349. 
144 Herrenreiter, above n 143, 354. Since the case concerned the use of the plaintiff's image, section 823 II 
in conjunction with section 22 of the Copyright (Art Domain) Act applied as the more specific provision 
for protection. The court granted compensation for non-pecuniary damage of 10.000 Deutsche marks. 
145 Luth BVerfGE (1958) 7, 198. 
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purpose of the Bill of Rights is to constrain state power. 146 Nevertheless, the court regards 
it equally right that: 147 
Far from being a value-free system the Constitution erects an objective system 
of values in its section on basic rights, and thus expresses and reinforces the 
validity of the basic rights. This system of values, centring on freedom of the 
human being to develop in society, must apply as a constitutional axiom 
throughout the whole legal system: it must direct and inform legislation, 
administration, and judicial decision. It naturally influences private law as well; 
no rule of private law may conflict with it, and all such rules must be construed 
in accordance with its spirit. 
In doing so, the Constitutional Court established the principle of Drittwirkung or 
the so-called "indirect effect" of constitutional values. Although the rights guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights do not apply directly between private parties, they do inform the 
application and interpretation of the Civil Code. Of particular importance are insofar the 
"general clauses" of the Civil Code148, provisions where the "defendant's actions are to 
be measured against standards of propriety and reasonableness." 149 The judges state that 
general clauses: 150 
[A]llow the courts to respond to this influence [of the value-system of the basic 
constitutional rights] since in deciding what is required in a particular case by such 
social commands, they must start from the value- system adopted by the society in 
its constitution at that stage of its cultural and spiritual development. The general 
clauses have thus been rightly described as "points of entry" for basic rights into 
private law. 
Thus, it can be said that constitutional rights , namely dignity and liberty, 
constituted the basis upon which the civil privacy protection was developed. 151 
146 Luth, above n 145, 204. 
147 Luth, above n 145, 205. 
148 Such clauses are sections 138, 242, 826 German Civil Code. 
149 Craig, above n 43, 377. 
150 Luth, above n 145, 206. 
151 See Craig, above n 43, 378. 
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C Private Statutory Protection of Privacy and the Provided Remedies 
Section 823 (1) of the Civil Code which protects the right to one's personality 
reads: 152 
(1) A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or other rights of another is bound to compensate him for any 
damage arising there from. 
Since the doctrine of the "indirect effect", the term other rights includes the right 
to one's personality . 
As it can be inferred from the provision itself, the courts can grant damages for 
unlawful and culpably infringements of privacy. Furthermore, parties can seek the 
publication of counterstatements or injunctions according to section 823 (1) of the Civil 
Code in conjunction with section 1004 Civil Code. Last but not least, section 823 (1) in 
conjunction with 253 (1) of the Civil Code provides compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage. 153 
Notably, there is no priority for damages over injunctions. It is up to the plaintiffs 
to specify which remedy they are seeking and to prove whether the requirements of the 
relative provision are fulfilled. 154 
D Protection of the Right to Control One's Own Image 
The more specific right to control one's own image is a statutory definition of the 
constitutional right to one's personality in context of the own image. 155 Section 22 of the 
Copyright (Art Domain) Act states: 156 
152 German Civil Code, section 823 (I). 
153 See for example Herrenreiter, above n 143. Indeed, non-pecuniary damages can be granted only if two 
conditions are fulfilled : The infringement of the personality right must be severe and injunctive re lief, 
counterstatement or revocation are not sufficient to compensate the plaintiff, see BGH [ 1971] NJW 698. 
15~ Otto Palandt Buergerliches Ceset::,buch (60 ed, Beck, Muenchen, 2001) 902. 
155 Palandt, above n 154, 998. 
156 Copyright (Art Domain) Act, section 22. 
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Images and likenesses of a person shall be published only with the consent of the 
depicted person. If there is any doubt on consent, if the depicted person got paid 
for the fact that he was depicted, the consent is assumed. 
The provision covers images that reveal the identity of the depicted person. It is 
not necessary that the person's face is visible as long as the identity can be derived from 
certain characteristics. 
I Exemptions to section 22 Copyright (Art Domain) Act 
Section 23 of the Copyright (Art Domain) Act provides for exemptions m the 
following cases: 157 
(I) Without consent may be published: 
l. Images and likenesses of contemporary history; 
2. Images in which persons are only accessory parts beside a landscape or a location ; 
3. Images or likenesses of assemblies, demonstrations, or similar events in which the 
person participated. 
Under section 23 (2), however, that exception does not apply where the 
publication interferes with a legitimate interest of the person concemed. 158 
The protection by degrees under these provisions "ensures that they take account 
of both the need to protect the person being represented and the community's desire to be 
informed and the interest of the media which satisfy that desire." 159 
Of particular interest for celebrities is the exemption of section 23 (1) no. l 
concerning images and likenesses of contemporary history. In this context, two questions 
are of importance. Firstly, the question of whether every celebrity is subject to this 
provision notwithstanding the functions he fulfils (appearance at official events or only 
daily life activities). Secondly, under which conditions section 23 (2) applies, meaning 
that the celebrity has a legitimate interest in not publishing the pictures. 
157 Copyright (Art Domain) Act, section 23 (]). 
158 Copyright (Art Domain) Act, section 23 (2). 
159 BVerfG (2000) 14 NJW 1021, 1023. 
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Since the early 1990s Princess Caroline of Monaco has been trying to prevent the 
publication of photos about her private life in the German tabloid press. She is a member 
of the Prince Rainier family and president of certain humanitarian or cultural foundations. 
Although she represents the ruling family at special events such as the Red Cross Ball , 
she does not perform any function on behalf of the State of Monaco. 160 The Caroline 
claims forced the German Courts to consider in detail the protection for privacy that is 
provided by German law. 
E Interpretation of Sections 22 and 23 Copyright (Art Domain) Act 
1 Judgment of the Hamburg Regional Court and Court of Appeal 
Three series of photos have been subject to proceedings since 1993, depicting 
Caroline alone going about her daily business, Caroline with her children and Caroline 
with actor Vincent Lindon and later in 1997, with Prince Ernst August. 161 
The first set of proceedings started in 1993 when Caroline sought an injunction in 
the Hamburg Regional Court and on appeal in the Hamburg Court of Appeal against the 
publication of the above mentioned photos. She alleged the infringement of her 
personality rights, guaranteed by sections 2 (1) and l (1) Basic Law and her right to 
control the use of her own image protected by section 22 of the Copyright (Arts 
Domain) Act. 
Both courts held that Caroline, as a figure of contemporary society "par 
excellence" ( absolute Person der Zeitgeschichte) had to tolerate the dissemination 
according to section 23 (1) no. l Copyright Act. Although the courts accepted that 
being followed by paparazzi every day made her life more difficult, they did not 
assume that her legitimate interest in preventing the publication would outweighs 
the legitimate desire to inform the general public. Her right of privacy stopped at 
160 See Von Hannover v Cen11any (2004) Application No 59320/00 (Section lll, ECHR) 4. This is of 
importance since it will become obv ious in the course of thi s paper that politicians enjoy less privacy 
protection due to their special functions for the state and public. 
161 See von Hannover v Germany , above n 160, 5-6 for a detail ed li st of pictures in the several series 
between 1993 and I 997. 
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the front door and therefore, she had to tolerate the publication of pictures that 
were taken in a public place. 162 
2 Judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of 19 December 1995 
On appeal, the Federal Court of Justice differed from the former judgments 
insofar as the pictures of Caroline and Vincent Lindon were concemed. 163 The relevant 
pictures depicted the Princess and her former partner in a dark comer of a restaurant 
courtyard. The Court granted an injunction arguing that these photos interfered with 
Caroline's right to privacy. 164 
The Court commences with defining what kind of images fall within the scope of 
"contemporary history". Thereafter, the meaning of section 23 (1) no. 1 includes pictures 
of people who, on account of their status and importance, attract the public attention and 
are deemed to be newsworthy, so-called figures of contemporary history "par 
excellence". 165 
Although Princess Caroline is such a person of contemporary history, the judges 
note that she is nevertheless entitled to respect for her private life. Outside the private 
home, a figure of contemporary history will enjoy protection as soon as she or he is: 166 
[I]n a secluded place to which the person concerned retires with the objectively 
recognisable aim of being alone and where, confident of being alone, behaves in a 
manner in which he or she would not behave in public. 
Since Caroline and her former partner had withdrawn to the far end of the garden 
restaurant, they had expressed the wish to be away from the public eye. 
Concerning the remaining pictures, the court held that the applicant had to tolerate 
their dissemination, even if they were showing scenes from her daily life and not showing 
162 See Hamburg Regional Court (4 February 1993) 324 0 537/93 and Hamburg Court of 
Appeal (8 December 1994) 3 U 64/94. 
16 BGH (1995) 131 BGHZ 332. 
164 BGH, above n 163,332. 
165 BGH, above n 163, 336. 
166 BGH, above n 163,339. 
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her exercising official functions. 167 The public has a legitimate interest in knowing where 
the applicant was staying and how she behaved in public, be it going shopping, sitting in 
a cafe, doing sports or going over other activities of daily life. 168 
3 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 15 December 1999 
Princess Caroline appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court alleging that the 
Federal Court of Justice did not effectively protect her privacy in public places and 
therefore did not adequately consider her private and family life. 
The Constitutional Court held that sections 22 and 23 Copyright Act on which the 
civil courts based their decision, were generally compatible with Basic Law. 169 The Court 
assumed that: 170 
[R]egard must be had, in interpreting and applying sections 22 and 23 of the KUG, 
not only to general personality rights, but also to the freedom of the press 
guaranteed by section 5 (1), second sentence, of the Basic Law in so far as the 
provision in questions also affect those freedoms. 
Entertainment is sometimes as important as purely factual information in 
forming opinions and is "neither negligible nor entirely worthless". 171 This applies 
also for information concerning people. In particular celebrities embody certain 
moral values and lifestyles and form role models for many people. This is what 
explains the public interest in the various ups and downs occurring in their lives. 
For people acting in the political domain this has always been deemed legitimate 
but is applicable also in respect of other public figures. 172 
On the other hand, the competing legitimate interest of figures of 
contemporary history "par excellence" in not publishing certain pictures according 
to section 23 (2) is satisfied by developing the criterion of a secluded place. The 
Court held that this criterion provides the individual with a phere in which she or 
167 BGH, above n 163, 344. 
168 BGH, above n 163, 343. 
169 BYerfG, above n 159, 1023. 
170 BYerfG, above n 159, 1024. 
171 BYerfG, above n 159, 1024. 
172 BYerfG, above n 159, 1024. 
43 
he, even in public places, is not subject to permanent media attention. At the same 
time it "does not excessively restrict press freedom because it does not impose a 
blanket ban on pictures of the daily or private life of figures of contemporary 
society". 
173 
Therefore, the rights of privacy and freedom of the press are adequately 
balanced and the publication is lawful. 
(a) Privacy rights of celebrity children 
The Constitutional Court made one exception concerning the pictures of Caroline 
and her children. It held that the Federal Court of Justice has not met the constitutional 
requirements. In contrast, the relevant decision has disregarded "the fact that the right to 
protection of personality rights of a person in the appellant's situation is strengthened by 
section 6 of the Basic Law regarding that person's intimate relations with their 
children."174 As a result, the Constitutional Court referred the case back to the Federal 
Court of Justice in order to take into account the right of section 6 (1) and (2) Basic 
Law:11s 
(I) Marriage and the family enjoy the special protection of the State. 
(2) The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty 
primarily incumbent on them. The State community shall oversee the performance 
of that duty. 
As a result, the courts have to balance sections 2 (1), 1 (l) and 6 Basic Law on the 
one side and section 5 (l) Basic Law on the other side. Since children enjoy special 
protection within the constitutional frame, the parent-child relationship outweighs 
freedom of expression and photographs cannot be published without the parent's consent. 
4 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
Almost 4 years later, a landmark ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
. f h G . . d 176 challenged the notion o t e errnan Junspru ence. 
173 BVerfG, above n 159, 1025 
174 BVerfG, above n 181 , 1026. 
175 German Basic Law, section 6. 
176 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 160. Between the judgments or the Constitutional Court and the 
ECHR, Caroline instituted a second and third set or legal proceedings in Germany concerning pictures 
taken and published in 1997. However, the claims were dismissed by the courts, referring to the grounds or 
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In 2000, Princess Caroline applied to the ECHR arguing that the German court 
decisions had infringed her right to respect for her private and family life guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the Convention, which provides: 177 
J. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this ri ght 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The ECHR first refers to the importance of privacy and states that: 178 
Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, 
without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in hi s relations 
with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with 
others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of "private life". 
The judges then consider the application of the Convention between private 
individuals. As already mentioned, human rights instruments are generally intended to 
protect the individual from interference by the state. Nevertheless, the ECHR does 
recognise that the state may also have the positive obligation to protect privacy between 
private parties by adopting "measures designed to secure respect for private life" .179 
In determining who is entitled to such privacy protection, "a fundamental 
distinction needs to be made between reporting facts capable of contributing to a debate 
in a democratic society ... and reporting details of the private life of an individual who 
the Federal Court of Justice' s judgment of 19 December 1995 and the Federal Constitutional Court's 
judgment of 15 Dece mber 1999. 
177 European Convention on Human Ri ghts, Article 8. Subject to the application have been all published 
photos excluding the ones depicting Princess Caroline with her children and with Vincent Lindon at the far 
end of the restaurant si nce the publication of these pictures was already held inadmissible by German 
Courts. 
178 Von Hannover v Cermanv, above n 160, 22-23. 
179 Von Hannover v Cemwn:v, above n I 60, 24. 
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does not exercise official functions." 180 The ECHR states that in the latter case, the 
individual must be free from intrusions since the pure purpose of satisfying the curiosity 
of people is not a sufficient reason to interfere with a person's private life. On the other 
hand, reports concerning matters of political or public debate enjoy the protection of 
freedom of expression since in those cases the media "exercises its vital role of 
'watchdog' in a democracy". 181 
The Court assumes that the current interpretation of section 23 (1) of the 
Copyright (Arts Domain) Act by German courts: 
[C]ould conceivably be appropriate for politicians exerc1smg official functions. 
However, it cannot be justified for a 'private' individual, such as the applicant, in 
whom the interest of the general public and the press is based solely on her 
membership of a reigning family whereas she herself does not exercise any official 
functions. 
The competing interests are not fairly balanced by the German courts unless 
the Copyright Act will be interpreted narrowly, covering publications that contribute 
to a debate of general interest to society only. 182 
F Enforcement of the European Court Judgement in Germany 
1 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court concerning the binding effect of 
ECHR decisions 
Two weeks after the Caroline ruling of the ECHR went into effect, the Federal 
Constitutional Court released a judgment concerning the binding effect of decisions of 
the ECHR. 183 
The German Constitutional Court decided that: 184 
180 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 160, 26. 
181 Von Hanno ver v Germanv, above n 160, 26. 
182 Von Hannover v Gemw11:v, above n 160, 28-29. 
183 BYerfG ( 14 October 2004) 2 BvR 1481/04 para 1-72, 47 JW 3407 (condensed version). 
184 BYerfG, above n 183. para 29. 
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The authorities and courts of the Federal Republic of Germany are obliged, under 
certain conditions , to take account of the European Convention on Human Rights as 
interpreted by the ECHR in making their deci sions. 
Nevertheless, the European Convention on Human Rights has only the status of a 
federal law and is "not a direct constitutional standard of review in the German legal 
system." 185 Thus, the term of "taking into account" is to be interpreted as: 186 
[T]aking notice of the Convention provision as interpreted by the ECHR and 
applying it to the case, provided the application does not violate prior-ranking law, in 
particular constitutional law. 
No contradiction with the aim of commitment to international law occurs, where 
legislature does not comply with international agreements in order to prevent the 
violation of fundamental principles of the German constitution. 187 However, if the courts 
want to differ from the decisions of the ECHR, they have the duty to justify 
understandably why they do not follow the international interpretation of the law. 188 
Attention must also be paid to the fact that cases of individual application 
proceedings under Article 34 of the Convention consider only the two-party relationship 
between the complainant and the state. Third parties cannot take part in the proceedings 
and thus, the original proceedings "possibly d[o] not give a complete picture of the legal 
positions and interests involved." 189 
Finally, the court states that ECHR decisions may encounter national partial 
systems of law fo1med by a diversity of case law. The Constitutional Court refers 
explicitly to the Caroline ruling of the ECHR. It states that in particular in the area of the 
protection of personality rights , the competing "fundamental rights are balanced by the 
creation of groups of cases and graduated legal consequences." 190 Provided that such a 
partial system of domestic law exists, the state bodies must consider the effects that 
ECHR decisions may have on the national legal system since: 191 
185 BVerfG, above n 183 , para 32. 
186 BVerfG, above n 183, para 62. 
187 BVerfG, above n 183, para 35. 
188 BVerfG, above n 183, para 50. 
189 BVerfG, above n 183, para 59. 
190 BVerfG, above n 183, para 58. 
191 BVerfG, above n 183, para 47. 
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Both a failure to consider a decision of the ECHR and the 'enforcement' of such a 
decision in a schematic way, in violation of prior-ranking law, may violate 
fundamental rights in conjunction with the principle of the rule of law. 
2 German jurisprudence in the aftermath of the "Caroline rulings" 
There are at least two decisions displaying the approach of German Courts after 
the judgments of the ECHR and the Federal Constitutional Court. 
The first decision concerned the German business family Otto. 192 One of the Otto 
brothers faced divorce in the United States. Due to an expected payment of an immense 
alimony, the Manager Magazin ran a story, revealing the facts of the expected divorce 
and speculating about the possible impacts for the Otto Group. 
In the past, matters such as divorce have always been considered private. 
Nevertheless, it was admissible to publish divorce related facts since the family's private 
matters could have an impact for involved businesses or companies. To this extent, the 
public interest prevailed over the protection of privacy rights .
193 
In contrast, referring verbally to the decision of the Strasbourg judges, the Berlin 
Regional Court held for the plaintiff and prohibited the publication of the article. 
194 
The second decision too, concerned an article ran by the Hamburg Manager 
Magazin in November 2004. 195 This time the magazine reported about the Merckle group 
of companies and published along with the article photos of the businessman Ludwig 
Merckle. The entrepreneur sued the magazine for publishing the pictures and suceeded. 
The Court, referring to the Caroline judgment of the ECHR, held that "the photo's sole 
purpose was to satisfy the curiosity of the readership." 196 
192 Berlin Regional Court (Landgericht) 27 0 682/04. Onother deci sion concerned the publication of facts 
concerning the new partner of the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer. The Court held that the public 
has a legitimate interest who the new partner of the politician is and dismissed the claim of the woman, see 
Berlin Regional Court 27 0 842/03. 
193 Palandt, above n 154, 998. 
194 Berlin Regional Court, above n 192. 
195 Hamburg Regional Court (Landgericht) 312 0 308/04. 
196 Hamburg Regional Court, above n 195. 
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Notably, the pictures were not made by paparazzi but reporters of the Manager 
Magazine. They took the pictures in an open house event to which photographers and 
camera teams were explicitly admitted. 
G Outcome of the Caroline Rulings for Celebrities in Germany 
Although the German government declared that the effects of the ECHR decision 
on press freedom will remain minimum197, recent decisions show that the courts grant 
weight to the Strasbourg orders in determining whether privacy rights have been violated. 
It seems that German courts hesitate to defy the international interpretation of the right to 
privacy. One can only speculate about the reasons since the Constitutional Court 
provided a back-door for German Courts to adhere to the previous developed domestic 
case law. Two reasons might have deterred the jurisprudence from giving more leeway to 
the media - the fear to fail to duly consider the decision and the obstacle of an 
understandably justification in case the Courts would like to differ from the ECHR 
decision. The press reacted immediately and the publication of photos made by paparazzi 
decreased considerably since the ECHR decision. 
198 
The current position of the German Courts can be summarised as follows . 
Celebrities enjoy a broad protection of their privacy rights for publications of pictures are 
admissible only if they contribute to a debate of public interest. Everyday activities 
cannot be covered in the media as long as the only purpose is to satisfy curiosity of the 
readership. The threshold is even higher for pictures depicting the children of celebrities. 
Such publications are not permissible without the consent of the parents unless the 
children are intentionally thrust into the public eye. 
Politicians are the only category of celebrities who face a lower degree of privacy 
protection. They have to condone the disclosure of almost all facts concerning their 
private lives including their love lives. As a result, even their husbands, wifes and 
partners have to accept the disclosure of facts that are related to to the politician.
199 
197 see Marina Klichen " Privacy Ri ghts vs. Free Speech" (2004) Global Journali st Magazine, Fourth 
Quarter 2004. 
198 See Caroline Judgment <http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Caroline judgment> (last accessed I 6.09.2005). 
199 See Berlin Regional Court, above n 192. 
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VI LAW OF PRIVACY IN CANADA 
In terms of intrusion in an individual's privacy by the media, Canada provides 
presently only partial protection.20
0 
A Privacy Protection for Intrusions by the Media in Quebec 
In Quebec, the only Canadian province that uses civil law instead of common law, 
the development is the furthest in the whole of Canada. Invasion of privacy was first 
recognised within article 1053 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, a general delict 
provision which declared that every person capable of discerning right from wrong is 
responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, 
imprudence, neglect or want of skill. In 1957, the Quebec Superior Court applied this 
provision to an invasion of the plaintiff's private life in Robbins v CBC.
201 This decision 
was the starting point for a series of cases to hold individuals liable for an invasion of 
privacy under the Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC). 
Finally, this general recognition was affirmed by giving privacy the status of a 
right. Article 3 of the Civil Code of Quebec
202 declares that: 
3. Every person is the holder of personality rights, such as the right to life, the 
right to the inviolability and integrity of his person, and the right to the respect 
of his name, reputation and privacy. 
These rights are inalienable. 
Chapter III. articles 35 and 36 which deal with "respect of reputation and privacy" 
include similar provisions.2°3 
200 ln almost the same manner as New Zealand, Canada also enacted several laws concerning special areas 
of privacy. The two federal privacy laws are the Privacy Act 1983 and the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Although both acts concern the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information the former applies only for government departments and agencies while the later sets 
out the rules for private sector organizations. 
201 Robbins v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation ( 1957) 12 DLR (2d) 35 (QSC). 
202 The Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ) came into effect on I January 1994. It replaced the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada (CCLC) enacted in 1865 which entered into force on 1
st July 1866. 
203 See Appendix Three for the wording of the provisions. 
50 
Furthermore, due to section 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, every person is assured "a right to respect for his private life" and section 49 
of the Charter declares "[a]ny unlawful interference ... entitles the victim to obtain the 
cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice 
resulting therefrom." 204 
The codification of the right to privacy led to the emergence of further important 
case law. One significant decision in this respect is Les Editions Vice-Versa Inc v 
Aubry.205 In this case, a woman was photographed sitting on a step in front of a building 
in a Montreal street. The photograph was taken without the respondent's consent and 
published in an art magazine. 
Although the photograph was taken in a public place, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal by the photographer and publisher stating that:
206 
If the purpose of the right to privacy guaranteed by s. 5 of the Quebec Charter 
is to protect a sphere of individual autonomy, that right must include the ability 
to control the use made of one's image, since the right to one's image is based 
on the idea of individual autonomy, that is, on the control each person has over 
his or her identity. 
The judges go on to hold that there is an infringement of the person's right to his 
or her image "as soon as the image is published without consent and enables the person to 
be identified"207 and that "the public nature of the place where the photograph was taken 
is irrelevant".208 
Nevertheless, the court also notes that the expectation of privacy can be reduced 
in certain circumstances and that aspects of the private life of public figures can become 
matters of public interest.The judges refer expressly to artists and politicians, but also 
more generally, to all those whose professional success depends on public opinion. 
209 
204 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, s. 5 and 49. 
205 Les Editions Vice -Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127. 
206 Les Editions Vice -Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127, para 52 L' Heureux-Dube and Bastarache JJ. 
207 Les Editions Vice -Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127, para 53 L' Heureux-Dube and Bastarache JJ. 
208 Les Editions Vice -Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127, para 59 L' Heureux-Dube and Bastarache JJ. 
209 See Les Editions Vice- Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127, paras 57-58 L'Heureux-Dube and Bastarache JJ. 
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Unfortunately, Canadian case law does not shed further light on the handling of 
celebrities. Apart from the vague term that " the private life of public figures can become 
a matter of public interest", the judges give no more detailed guidelines concerning the 
admissibility of publishing pictures taken in a public place. 
Therefore, the law of Quebec is, at least in terms of privacy protection for 
celebrities, far from being methodologically sound and fixed. The interplay of the Quebec 
Charter and the Quebec Civil Code which displays broad guarantees given to privacy is, 
due to the generality of the provisions and the lack of relating case law, not very 
instructive. 
B Privacy Protection for Intrusions by the Media in the Common Law Provinces 
1 Provinces with a statutory tort of privacy 
British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan enacted special 
Privacy Acts providing for a statutory tort of privacy.210 The wording of the acts is very 
general and similar in all four provinces. The Acts provide that:
211 
(1) It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and 
without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of an individual. 
(2) The nature and degree of privacy to which an individual is entitled in a 
situation or in relation to a matter is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, 
regard being given to the lawful interests of others; and in determining whether the 
act or conduct of a person constitutes a violation of the privacy of an individual, 
regard shall be given to the nature, incidence, and occasion of the act or conduct 
and to the relationship, whether domestic or other, between the parties. 
The statutes also include rules concerning the unauthorised use of name or portrait 
of another person without expressed or implied consent of the individual or some other 
person who has the lawful authority to give the consent. 212The publication of pictures 
210 Privacy Act British Columbia RSBC 1979 c 336; Privacy Act Manitoba RSM 1987 c Pl25; Privacy Act 
of Newfoundland and Labrador RSN 1990 c P-22 ; Pri vacy Act of Saskatchewan RSS 1978 c P-24. 
2 11 Privacy Act Newfoundland and Labrador, section 3 as an example for the very similar definitions in all 
for provinces. 
2 12 See Privacy Act Newfoundland and Labrador, section 4; Privacy Act British Columbia, section 3; 
Privacy Act Manitoba, section 3; Privacy Act Saskatchewan, section 3. 
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without consent is not a violation of privacy where the matter published was of public 
interest or was a fair comment an a matter of public interest. The public interest is a 
defence to the statutory tort.213 
Similar to Quebec, the general wording of the Privacy Act provisions has rarely 
been subject to interpretation by case law. In terms of privacy protection for celebrities, 
there are actually no relevant cases. It is almost unpredictable under which conditions 
Canadian courts would permit the publication of photos concerning the private life of 
celebrities. That might be the reason why in the Hosking decision, the dissenting Keith J 
stated that the general privacy torts are of "very limited value".
214 Until now, there is also 
no answer to the question when the publication of celebrity pictures would be justified by 
the defence of public interest. 
However, in case the conditions for a privacy violation are met, the Privacy Acts 
provide civil sanctions ranging from awarding damages and granting injunctions to 
ordering the defendant to deliver up to the plaintiff all articles or documents that have 
come into his or her possession by reason of the violation. At present, it seems that all the 
remedies are of equal value and damages do not take priority over injunctions.
215 
2 Provinces without a statutory tort of privacy 
The rest of the eight Canadian provinces do not provide any protection concerning 
the publication of information as to the private lives of individuals. Unless the facts 
published are false and defamatory, there is no cause of action providing compensation. 
Although the federal Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 provides no 
special provision protecting the right to privacy, attention should be paid to section 8 of 
the Canadian Charter.216 The right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
contained in section 8 has received a broad interpretation in recent years. The Supreme 
2 13 See Privacy Act Newfoundland and Labrador, section 5 (2) (a) ; Privacy Act Briti sh Columbia, section 2 
(3) (a); Privacy Act Manitoba, section 5 (f); Privacy Act Saskatchewan, section 4 (2) (a) . 
2 14 Hosking v R1111ti11g, above n 44, para 219 Keith J. 
2 15 See Privacy Act Newfoundland and Labrador. sections 6 and 7; Privacy Act Manitoba, section 4; 
Privacy Act Saskatchewan, section 7. The Privacy Act of British Columbia does not provide explicitly for 
remedies. 
2 16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, secti on 8, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 
1982 (UK), sch B). 
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Court of Canada followed the prominent United States case Katz v United States2
17 and 
held in Hunter v Southam
218 that the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 
protected a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
219
. Property has now been replaced by 
privacy as the value protected by section 8 of the Charter.
220 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made it very clear that its decisions relating to 
section 8:221 
[R]ecognize that there is a fundamental difference between a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her dealings with the state and the same person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her dealings with ordinary citizens. 
Due to this essential difference, individuals cannot rely directly on section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter when seeking compensation for an invasion of privacy by a third party 
that is not the state. 
Nonetheless, there is still light at the end of the tunnel, for Canadian appellate 
courts have never expressly denied a stand-alone common law privacy tort that protects 
privacy matters between private parties. On the contrary, it does seem that the Canadian 
courts are prepared to recognise a common law tort. The recent developments in Ontario 
allow the inference that there is an emerging common law right of privacy that "has the 
real potential to be recognized throughout Canada".
222 
In Saccone v Orr223 the defendant recorded a private telephone conversation with 
the plaintiff which the defendant later played at a municipal council meeting, although he 
was told by the plaintiff not to use the recording. In addition, the tape was subsequently 
published in the local newspaper. The plaintiff claimed no material loss but damages for 
embarrassment caused by tortious invasion of privacy. 
2 17 Katz. v United States, above n 127. In that case, police had placed a listening device on the outside of a 
public telephone booth and listened and recorded conversations. The Supreme Court held that the fourth 
amendment was not confined to the protection of property . In contrast, the fourth amendment protects 
~ople, not places. 
18 Hunter v Southam [ 1984] 2 SCR 145 (SCC). 
2 19 Humer v Southam , above n 218, 159. 
220 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3 ed , Carswell, Scarborough Ontario, 1992) I 055. 
22 1 Les Editiom Vice -Versa Inc v Aubry, above n 127, para 8 Lamer CJC. 
222 Craig, above n 43, 367. 
223 Saccone I' Orr ( 1981) 34 OR (2d) 317 (County Court). 
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Jacob Co. Ct. J held that the law of Ontario recognised a right of action for 
invasion of privacy and:224 
Certainly, for want of a better description as to what happened, this is an invasion 
of privacy and, despite the very able argument of defendant 's counsel that no such 
action exists, I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff must be given some 
right of recovery for what the defendant has in this case done. 
As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to damages of$ 500 and costs. 
The second case occurred ten years later and regarded a dispute between 
neighbours concerning an access road. 225 The plaintiffs sought damages for verbal 
harassment, physical assault and property damage. Besides nuisance, trespass, assault and 
battery, Mandel J also considered an invasion of privacy. He commenced with the 
question of whether there is a right to privacy in Canada. And citing the case of Hunter v 
Southam, he assumes that the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the existence of 
such a right. 226 Therefore, he continues, "the next question to be answered is, is there an 
actionable cause for an invasion of such right in Canada?"227 And he answers:
228 
At the stage of pleadings the courts have refused to dismiss actions for invasion of 
privacy on the basis that it has not been shown that such a right does not exist. .. In 
my view such a right does exist. 
To hold otherwise would "stultify the common law and its history." 
229 
In 
determining whether an invasion of privacy is actionable, the courts have to consider the 
circumstances of each particular case and the conflicting rights involved.
23° For the 
case assessed, the campaign of the defendant:
23 1 
l C]onstitute[s] a harassment of the plaintiffs in the enjoyment of their property 
which is of a kind that a person of normal sensitivity would regard as offensive and 
intolerable and is an invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy .. . 
224 Saccone v Orr, above n 223, 321-322, Jacob Co. Ct. J . 
225 Roth v Roth (1991) 4 OR (3d) 740 (Ontario Court, General Division). 
226 Roth v Roth, above n 225, 757 Mandel J. 
227 Roth v Roth , above n 225, 757 Mandel J. 
228 Roth v Roth , above n 225, 758 Mandel J. 
229 Roth v Roth , above n 225, 758 Mandel J. 
230 Roth v Roth , above n 225, 758 Mandel J. 
23 1 Roth v Roth, above n 225, 759 Mandel J. 
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Finally, in MacKay v Buelow232 the plaintiff sought damages for harassment from 
her former husband. His continuing attacks included telephone calls day and night, 
threats to kidnap their daughter and death threats. As a result of the husband's actions, the 
plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which required a considerable long-
term treatment. 
Binks J held that there was not only trespass to a person and intentional infliction 
of mental suffering and emotional stress but also invasion of privacy. In his judgment he 
relied on the Roth decision, but did not give an answer as to which elements must be 
fulfilled in order to violate the privacy of an individual. 
C Outcome for Celebrities in Canada 
How much privacy protection celebrities would enjoy in Canada is presently not 
predictable. Although Quebec and four of the common law provinces enacted provisions 
concerning privacy, the wording of the norms is general and open for interpretation by 
the courts. Unfortunately, such interpretation has not taken place in recent years due to a 
lack of relevant claims. 
In the remaining eight common law provinces, even such general provisions are 
non-existent, with the exception of section 8 of the Canadian Charter that provides for the 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. In the past, the norm experienced a 
broad interpretation by the Supreme Court and includes also a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. That might be the reason for the enthusiastic discussion concerning the 
. . f I h. h d . 233 recogmt1on o a common aw tort, w 1c emerge m recent years. 
However, according to the Supreme Court, the importance of Charter values does 
"require the judiciary to interpret and develop the common law in a manner consistent 
with the fundamental values of Canadian society enshrined in the Charter."
234 Since 
privacy stands as both a Charter value and a fundamental value of Canadian society it 
232 Mac Kay 1• Buelow ( 1995) 11 RFL (4th) 403 (Ontario Court, General Division). 
233 See the article of Craig, above n 43. 
234 See RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery [ I 986] 2 SCR 573, 603 (SCC) . 
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might even create an obligation to the courts to protect this value between private 
parties.235 
The last part of this paper will argue that the demand for a stand-alone privacy 
tort is legitimate and that the approaches in Germany and New Zealand can be of help in 
developing the scope of such a tort. The experience made in the different systems will 
reveal advantages and disadvantages of certain tort elements and help to establish a 
privacy protection that balances privacy rights and press freedom in a reasonable manner. 
In order to get a picture of how the Canadian courts could develop and establish 
privacy protection, the following comparison is essential. 
VII PRIVACY RIGHTS IN COMPARISON 
A Protection of Facts and Images 
At present, Germany provides the broadest privacy protection for celebrities. 
Since the 1990s when Caroline von Monaco challenged German privacy protection, the 
relevant privacy provisions of the Basic Law, Civil Code and Copyright (Art Domain) 
Act experienced a detailed interpretation by the German courts. 
Although the courts initially hesitated to protect celebrities from intrusions into 
their private lives, in 1995 the German Federal Court of Justice decided that also figures 
of contemporary society "par excellence" were entitled to respect for their private life in 
public places as soon as they had retired to a secluded place. Five years later, the Federal 
Constitutional Court extended the protection even further. The right to protection of 
privacy rights is strenghened by Article 6 Basic Law (marriage and family) if a person's 
intimate relation with their children is concerned. As a result, the publication of pictures 
depicting the children of celebrities requires the consent of the parents or any other lawful 
representative. 
In June 2004, the European Court held that the publication of everyday activities 
of celebrities photographed in public places was subject to the prior consent of the person 
235 Craig, above n 43, 371 and see also Geddis, above n 122, 685-687 where the author discusses the 
reasons why human rights instruments should be of importance also with regard to the private law. 
57 
concerned unless the publication was capable of contributing to a debate of general 
interest to society. 
Although this landmark decision was seen by the German Press as the final nail in 
the coffin concerning press freedom, the German courts seem to feel bound by the 
decision. 
At present, the only remaining possibility for the German press to publish details 
of the private lives of celebrities is by satisfying a general interest of the public rather 
than pure curiosity of a certain readership. The question of when such matters of public 
interest are concerned, must be left to further interpretation by the courts. By now, it 
seems that photos depicting celebrities wearing fur or crocodile bags could be published 
without consent since the use of animal coats in the clothing industry have been subject 
to public debate in recent years. However, both photos and the relating article will need 
to concern public matters. Otherwise it would be easy to circumvent the requirements of 
the ECHR.236 
In contrast, protection for celebrities in New Zealand is less extensive. The New 
Zealand courts made clear that the publication of facts concerning the private lifes of 
celebrities is in most cases admissible. Only the publication of facts that is truly 
humiliating or harmful can justify restrictions of the press. A legitimate public interest as 
a defence to the tort may even justify the publication of such facts. 
However, both New Zealand and Germany are in agreement where politicians are 
involved. Due to their public functions, they have to tolerate publications even the most 
delicate nature, for instance their love lives. 
B Rights of Celebrities' Children 
New Zealand does not protect the publication of photographs of children except a 
real risk of physical harm can be proven. The New Zealand Court of Appeal hold that the 
established tort elements are sufficient to protect adults and children's rights likewise. In 
236 Such an evasion would for instance occur if a magazine justifies the publication of photos depicting 
celebrities in bathing suits, by alleging that the photos contribute to the discussion concerning public 
exposure, although the article itself only reports on the summer vacation of the concerned celebrity. 
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contrast, the German Constitutional Court determined that due to section 6 of the Basic 
Law, the jurisprudence is obliged to give priority to the protection of children. 
Publication of pictures depicting children alone or with their celebrity parents is 
admissible only with consent. It seems that due to a lack of a provision protecting for 
family and childrens rights in the BORA, New Zealand does not consider children's 
rights to outweigh press freedom. 
C Impact of Constitutional Documents 
Another distinctive feature is the consideration and application of constitutional 
documents such as the New Zealand BORA and the German Basic Law to the 
development of privacy law. While the German Basic Law is the starting point and 
dominant factor for developing and establishing privacy protection, the New Zealand 
BORA, if at all, is only an additional rationale to justify the existence of a privacy tort. 
The first reason is that in the 1950s the German Constitutional Court has 
explicitly determined that the Basic Law in its sections l (1) and 2 (1) includes the right 
to privacy. In a second step, the German courts have recognised the horizontal effect of 
such a right to privacy. They developed the concept of "Drittwirkung" or "indirect effect" 
where constitutional values have to inform and direct the development of private law. 
The indirect application of constitutional rights even between private parties is realised 
by using the general clauses of the German Civil Code as "points of entry" for basic right 
into private law. Therefore, the right to one's personality included in section 823 (1) of 
the German Civil Code, and the right for protection of one's image provided by sections 
22 and 23 of the Copyright (Art Domain) Act, are the result of interpreting and applying 
the private law in accordance with the spirit and values of the German Basic Law. 
In New Zealand, the majority of the judges in Hosking held that the BORA does 
not provide for a right to privacy. Only Tipping J differed and stated that the right to 
one·s privacy is protected by the BORA, namely by analogy of section 21 providing for 
the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
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In addition, New Zealand has not yet recognised a general horizontal application 
of the BORA between private parties. 237 Although Hosking has provided a good 
opportunity for addressing the question of whether and to which extent the courts are to 
give effect to the rights guaranteed by the BORA, the judges ignored this chance. Despite 
lengthy justifications for why a stand-alone common law tort should be established in 
New Zealand, curiously the majority of the court declined to make a definitive statement 
concerning the application of the BORA between private litigants. In fact, such 
application is practically absent, bar its consideration by Tipping J determining that the 
Bill of Rights may inform new developments in the common law concerning the 
relationship between citizens. 238 
As a result, the establishment of the tort was justified by the general importance of 
privacy for individuals and the lacuna of its sufficient protection in the New Zealand law 
system. That is proven as well by the fact that the beginnings of a privacy tort go back to 
the year 1986. At that time, the BORA was not even in existence.239 
The BORA was probably even more of an obstacle than a justification for the 
establishment of a privacy tort. 
For the minority judges, the absence of an explicit privacy right and the presence 
of press freedom in the BORA was indeed the reason to give priority to the latter and 
deny a privacy tort as a whole. The joint judgment of the majority justified the 
affirmation of a privacy tort by stating that privacy as a general value is able to resonably 
limit press freedom. It seems, the two judges struggle with the absence of a privacy 
provision in the BORA and refer to section 5 probably as a last resort.240 At present, it is 
Tipping J's approach that can be deemed to be the most logical and consistent one. In 
stating that privacy is not only included in the BORA but may also effect the relations 
between private parties, he is the only judge in Hosking who can actually support the 
upholding of a privacy tort with the existence of the BORA. 
237 See Geddi s, above n 122,691. He states that the courts had only given obiter recogniti on to a role for the 
BORA in cases where a "public" aspect was involved. 
238 See the detailed discussion of the impact the BORA had on the Hosking decision in Chapter IVG of this 
paper. 
239 See Chapter IV C of this paper for the early deve lopments of the tort. 
240 See Chapter IVG for the notion of the joint judgement concerning the BORA impact. 
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D Provided Remedies 
New Zealand's approach to remedies for privacy right violations is strict. 
Celebrities who face publication of facts or images that fulfil the prequisites for an action, 
are generally prevented from seeking injunctions. Damages have priority over injunctions 
unless "there is compelling evidence of most highly offensive intended publicising of 
private information and there is little legitimate public concern in the information."241 
In comparison, Germany's remedies of damages, publication of counter-
statements and injunctions provided by the general tort provision of section 823 m 
conjunction with section 1004 Civil Code are of equal value. No distinct priority of 
damages over injunctions applies. Notably, an unlawful publication can also amount to a 
criminal offence punishable with fines or even prison sentences up to one year.
242 
E Canada 
Canada's approach to privacy protection for celebrities cannot be analysed yet. 
The norms in both civil law and common law provinces are too general and lack any 
illuminating interpretation . Eight of the common law provinces do not even have special 
provisions providing for privacy except the applicable federal norm of section 8 Canadian 
Charter. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has recognised a constitutional right of privacy in 
section 8 of the Charter, "rooted in individual autonomy and dignity" .
243 
Up to date, this 
is the only feature that can be subject to a comparison and it reveals a considerable 
resemblance with the approaches of the Gennan Constitutional Court and Tipping J in 
Hosking . They all have in common the formulation that privacy is part of the Charter 
values or constitutional protection. 
In particular, Canada's theory of Charter values serves as a starting point for a 
discussion concerning the recognition of a stand-alone privacy tort in Canada. Thus, the 
w Hosking v Runting, above n 58, para 158 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
242 Copyright (Art Domain) Act, section 33. 
243 Craig, above n 80, 37 1. 
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last Chapter attempts to argue why Canada should not deny its recognition and how such 
a privacy tort could look like. 
VIII WHY AND HOW CANADA'S COMMON LAW PROVINCES SHOULD 
RECOGNISE PRIVACY PROTECTION 
The Canadian Supreme Court stated that:244 
Grounded in a man 's physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the 
well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy of constitutional 
protection, but it also has profound significance for the public order. 
Reflecting the quotation, it becomes clear that Canada recognised a constitutional 
right of privacy for a reason. The impact privacy has on the individual and on a 
democratic society has been emphasised already earlier in this paper245 and has obviously 
also been acknowledged by Canada's highest court. 
However, another question is whether the guarantee of privacy in the Canadian 
Charter leads to the obligation to recognise such a right also in the common law. The 
answer to that question cannot be given easily. On the one hand, the common law is not 
subject to Charter scrutiny unless some state action on the part of the legislature or 
executive is involved.246 On the other hand, the Supreme Court held that the common law 
needs to be interpreted and developed in a manner consistent with the values of the 
Charter. 247 
Therefore, the next question to be answered is, what did the judges have in mind 
when they formulated the element " interpret and develop in a manner consistent with 
Charter values"? Two approaches are possible. First, the judges are given a choice 
whether or not to develop new common law actions. However, once they exercised that 
choice in favour for new developments, the Charter provides the framework and limits 
within which the evolution would have to take place. Secondly, already the decision for 
or against developing new common law actions must take into account Charter values 
w R v Dvment [1988] 2 SCR 417,427 (SCC) La Forest J. 
245 See f~r detail s Chapter 1Il B and C. 
246 Craig, above n 43, 370. 
w See R.WDSU v Dolphin Delivery, above n 256. 603. 
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and thus, the existence of a right to privacy in the Charter imposes an obligation for the 
courts to provide for privacy protection. 
There are two main reasons why the second interpretation should be preferred. To 
begin with, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is supreme law. Considerable 
violations of Charter values by domestic law render the relevant provisions void.248 Thus, 
Charter rights represent the fundamental values of the Canadian society which to protect 
and respect is the priority objective. In order to achieve this purpose, the provided rights 
must be secured not only within the relationship between state and citizen but also citizen 
to citizen. Since Charter values are not directly applicable between private parties, it is 
the duty of the judiciary to find alternative ways to provide adequate protection. 
Additionally, the astounding conceptual similarities with the German 
Constitution249 justify to make use of the German experience. There, it has already been 
accepted that the supremacy of the Constitution requires the application of the values 
throughout the whole legal system. 250 Germany, as a typical civil law jurisdiction, 
achieves its aim by using general clauses of the Civil Code to indirectly transplant 
constitutional rights into the private law. The equivalent counterpart for the Canadian 
common law provinces would be to provide for a stand-alone privacy tort.251 
Provided that the judiciary has an obligation to recognise a tort of privacy, which 
parameters should form part of the new tort? In reaching a conclusion, one might find it 
helpful to consider the wealth of experience in foreign jurisdictions. 
Although New Zealand's privacy tort is still in its infancy, one can already infer 
that protection for celebrities is very limited. In fact, restraining merely highly offensive 
publication of private facts is not enough. As stressed in the beginning of this paper, 
privacy has an immense impact on individuals and society. In particular for the formation 
of fundamental relations to family and friends, it is indispensable to provide a certain 
248 Hogg, above n 220, 124-125. Section 52 (I) of the Constitution Act 1982 provides: The Constitution of 
Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provi sions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistenc y, of no forc e or effect. 
249 First, the German Constitution is as well superior law. Secondly, part of this superior system of values is 
the right to privacy. Thirdly, the ri ght to privacy was not guaranteed explicitly in the constitutional 
document but has been found to be included in other ri ghts, section 8 Canadian Charter and sections l (I) 
and 2 (I) German Basic Law. 
250 See Lwh, above n 166. 
251 This applies at least as long as the legislative denies to enact corresponding statutes. 
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level of privacy. Surveys show that a lack of privacy also diminishes a person's mental 
health and well-being. Amongst celebrities, the figure of mental illnesses is alarmingly 
high. Thus, a broader safeguard is desirable for Canada. 
In contrast, the German approach to pnvacy protection for celebrities is 
generous. Since the ECHR decision, not only pictures depicting celebrities in a secluded 
place or with their children are prohibited, but all facts and photos that do not contribute 
to a debate of general public interest. Hence the publication of reports concerning purely 
the daily life activities of public figures are prohibited.252 These recent developments 
have met with harsh criticism. Journalists fear a serious threat to press freedom for the 
latest trends impose a stringent media privacy law. 253 The term "debate of general 
interest" is likely to be restrictively interpreted, namely only matters which could be said 
to engage a pressing public concern are admissible for publication.254 
Beside the restrictions for the media, a wide protection for celebrities also 
contravenes the functions that are attributed to celebrities. According to the German 
Constitutional Court they "embody certain moral values and lifestyles" and "become 
points of crystallisation for adaption or rejection and act as examples or counter-
examples. "255 
As a result, a tort of privacy in Canada should use a hybrid New Zealand/ 
Ge1many model. It is worthwile that privacy protection is not as narrow as in New 
Zealand and not as broad as the ECHR ruling. Taking into account the functions of 
celebrities and press freedom on the one hand and of privacy on the other hand, a well 
balanced tort should prohibit publication without consent under the following 
circumstances. 
1. The celebrity, although in a public place, has retired to a secluded place where 
it was objectively clear to everyone that they wanted to be alone. 
252 As mentioned above, that does not apply for politicians since also their private lifes can be of public 
interest due to their public functions. 
253 See KUchen, above n 197; Olswang "Von Hannover v Germany A proposal to petition the German 
Government to exercise its righ under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights to request 
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber" <http://www.olswang.com/pdf /hanover_petition.pdf> 
(last accessed 23 September 2005). 
m Olswang, above n 253, 4. 
255 BVerfG~ above n 159, 1024. 
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2. The celebrity acts not in a secluded place but is depicted with her/his children. 
3. The celebrity acts not in a secluded place but is depicted with his/her husband 
or wife, partners or friends (for fundamental relations such as love, frienship and 
trust are inconceivable without privacy). 
4. Only Celebritie's children are depicted (for children need special protection due 
to their particular vulnerability). 
However, as in New Zealand, there should exist the defence of public interest, 
meaning that the publication is lawful if the level of legitimate public concern outweighs 
the level of harm likely to be caused. This will mostly apply for politicians. 
In summary, publicity is admissible even without contributing to a general public 
interest as long as the celebrity is not in a secluded place or accompanied by family, 
partners or friends. Otherwise all everyday activities can be the subject matter of media 
coverage. 
XI CONCLUSION 
Celebrities benefit from publicity and thus have to take the good with the bad. 
However, that does not mean that they have no expectation of privacy. Germany provides 
presently the widest protection. The publication of facts related to private lives needs to 
contribute to a public debate. Celebrities' children are completely excluded from media 
coverage. 
In New Zealand, the disclosure of the private lives of celebrities and their children 
is generally admissible unless the publicity is truly humiliating and harmful. The reason 
for these differences probably lies in the influence of constitutional documents. In 
Germany, the superior Basic Law includes the right to privacy and was due to its 
horizontal application, the starting point for the development of an extensive protection. 
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In contrast, the NZBORA guarantees explicitly only the right to freedom of expression
256 
and the question of whether the Bill of Rights are applicable between private parties has 
not been answered yet. Thus, privacy protection is the product of a general recognition of 
privacy as a value rather than the adherence to duties implied by the BORA. 
In Canada, five provinces enacted privacy provisions relevant for celebrities. 
Unfortunately, their wording is general and has not yet been subject to further 
interpretation. The remaining eight common law provinces do not provide any provisions 
but seem at least, to be open to accept privacy as a fundamental value that needs to be 
recognised.257 In fact, section 8 of the federal Charter includes according to the Supreme 
Court the right to privacy. It is this recognition of privacy as part of Canada's supreme 
law that obliges the courts to act. The establishment of a privacy tort is the right way to 
secure privacy as an unevitable value for society and individual development. 
To reach an adequate balance between the competing rights, the media should 
be allowed to publish facts or pictures of everyday activities except when they relate to 
family, partners or friends. 
256 Only Tipping J differed from this general perception and stated that s 21 BORA includes the right to 
r,rivacy. 
-
57 See the di sc uss ion of recent case law in Ontario. 
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APPENDIX ONE - PRIVACY PRINCIPLES OF THE PRESS COUNCIL 
3. Privacy 
Everyone is entitled to privacy of person, space and personal information, and 
these rights should be respected by publications. Nevertheless the right of privacy 
should not interfere with publication of matters of public record, or obvious 
significant public interest. 
Publications should exercise care and discretion before identifying relatives of 
persons convicted or accused of crime where the reference to them is not directly 
relevant to the matter reported. 
Those suffering from trauma or grief call for special consideration, and when 
approached, or enquiries are being undertaken , careful attention is to be given to 
their sensibilities. 
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APPENDIX TWO-PRIVACY PRINCIPLES OF THE BROADCAST 
STANDARDS AUTHORITY 
i) The protection of privacy includes protection against the public disclosure of 
private facts where the facts disclosed are highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
ii) The protection of privacy also protects against the public disclosure of some 
kinds of public facts. The "public" facts contemplated concern events (such as 
criminal behaviour) which have, in effect, become private again, for example 
through the passage of time. Nevertheless, the public disclosure of public facts 
will have to be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
iii) There is a separate ground for a complaint, in addition to a complaint for the 
public disclosure of private and public facts, in factual situations involving the 
intentional interference (in the nature of prying) with an individual's interest in 
solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be offensive to the ordinary person but 
an individual's interest in solitude or seclusion does not provide the basis for a 
privacy action for an individual to complain about being observed or followed or 
photographed in a public place. 
iv) The protection of privacy also protects against the disclosure of private facts 
to abuse, denigrate or ridicule personally an identifiable person. This principle is 
of particular relevance should a broadcaster use the airwaves to deal with a 
private dispute. However, the existence of a prior relationship between the 
broadcaster and the named individual is not an essential criterion. 
v) The protection of privacy includes the protection against the disclosure by the 
broadcaster, without consent, of the name and/or address and/or telephone 
number of an identifiable person. This principle does not apply to details which 
are public information, or to news and current affairs reporting, and is subject to 
the "public interest" defence in principle (vi). 
vi) Discussing the matter in the "public interest" , defined as of legitimate 
concern or interest to the public, is a defence to an individual ' s claim for privacy. 
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vii) An individual who consents to the invasion of his or her privacy, cannot later 
succeed in a claim for a breach of privacy. Children's vulnerability must be a 
prime concern to broadcasters. When consent is given by the child, or by a 
parent or someone in loco parentis, broadcasters shall satisfy themselves that the 
broadcast is in the best interest of the child. 
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APPENDIX THREE- ARTICLES 35+36 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 
QUEBEC 
35. Every person has a right to the respect of his reputation and 
pnvacy. 
No one may invade the privacy of a person without the consent of 
the person unless authorized by law. 
36. The following acts, in particular, may be considered as 
invasions of the privacy of a person: 
1) entering or taking anything in his dwelling; 
2) intentionally intercepting or using his private communications; 
3) appropriating or using his image or voice while he is in private 
premises; 
4) keeping his private life under observation by any means; 
5) using his name, image, likeness or voice for a purpose other 
than the legitimate information of the public; 
6) using his correspondence, manuscripts or other personal 
documents. 
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